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ABSTRACT
A planetary protection policy is being developed with the intention of
reflecting the current state of the NASA planetary exploration program and the
knowledge of the solar system. In this development stugy, a critical review of
the present policy was conducted with emphasis on its application to future
planetary exploration. The probable impact of recent data on the implemen-
tation of the present policy was also assessed. The existing policy and its
implementation were found to: 1) be excessive for certain missions (e.g..
Voyager), f) neglect the contamination hazard posed by the bulk constituent
organics of spacecraft, 3) be ambiguous for certain missions (e.g., Pioneer
Venus), and 4) treat all extraterrestrial sample return missions alike.
The major features of the new policy are planet/mission combinations, a
qualitative top level statement, and implementation by exception rather than
rule. The concept of planet/mission categories permits the imposition of
requirements according to both biological interest in the target planet and the
relative contamination hazard of the mission type. This narrow construction
provides for the general replacement of the quantitative analysis required
under the present policy with qualitative requirements, for the elin m,ination of
all implementation requirements for most planetary missions and for the
simplification of the remaining compliance procedures.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The beginnings of planetary protection occurred in 1956 with attempts to
plan for the prevention of lunar and planetary contamination. Due to the
ccncern expressed over impending space exploration activities, an international
prigram involving a treaty, international law and national policy statements
was developed. The present U.S. !NASA Planetary Protection Program is based on
that treaty and on the NASA Policy Directive, NPD 8020.10A. Basic NASA
implementation requirements are presented in "Quarantine Provisions for
r	 Unmanned Extra-terrestrial Missions," NHB 8020.12A (ori ginal issuance 1969,
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revised 1976). Other than occasional revisions of the probability of growth
parameters, used to calculate the probability of planetary contamination, the
approach to planetary protection has changed little since 1972.
The basic NASA policy (and the treaty) established a probability
criterion of one in one thousand (1x10- 3 ) for contaminating a planet of
biological interest during the period of biological exploration. The standard
procedure for compliance by a flight project has consisted of analyzing the
probability of contaminating the target planet to demonstrate that the value is
less than the project's assigned allocation for the planet. This quantitative
approach has inherent weaknesses including the uncertainty in the required
input parameters (especially the probability of growth) and the dependence of
the mission allocation on the predicted number of future explorations of the
target planet. In addition the wealth of data obtained by planetary
exploration during this decade has consistently been negative on the existence
of indigenous life forms on other planets. The environmental findings have
also reduced estimates of the probability of growth co the point that no
planetary protection implementation is required for the outer planets and their
satellites under the current provisions. However, organizations such as the
Committee on Space Research (CUSPAR) and the Space Science Board (of the U.S.
National AcadeaW of Sciences) have recommended baseline requirements in these
cases by implication (e.g. cleanrooms).
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Basically the present planetary protection policy and requireme°,ts have
served well over the years. However, recently derived small and uncertain
values of the probability of growth severely strain the probabilistic approach.
Additional information obtained has led to added provisions and requirements on
a case by case basis. These changes have weakened the logic of the program and
occasionally caused inconsistencies. Now each new flight project must
negotiate special requirements and parameter values and will frequently seek
waivers from the Planetary Protection Officer.
The planetary protection policy and requirements described and proposed
in this report are responsive to the criticisms outlined above in that they
reflect more closely the present knowledge of the planets and other solar
system bodies, and are consistent with the number and types of missions
planned. The proposed basic policy eliminates all reference to probability of
contamination, and might be expressed by the following:
Although Cie existence of life elsewhere in the
solar system may be unlikely, the conduct of scien-
tific investigations of possible extraterrestrial
life forms, precursors and remnants must not be
jeopardized. In addition, the Earth must be
protected from the potential hazard posed by
extraterrestrial matter carried by a spacecraft
returning from another planet. Therefore, for
certain space mission/target planet combinations,
controls on contamination shall be imposed in
accordance with	 issuances
	
implementing	 this
policy.
This change permits significant de-emphasis on the use of mathematical
models and quantitative analyses in the requirements. The concept of target
planet/mission type categories is also introduced. With this concept both the
contamination threat posed by the type of mission (i.e. fly-by, orbiter, lander
or probe) and the degree of biological interest in the target planet may be
considered in the establishment of requirements by category.
x
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Categor, I essentially corresponds to the present class 1, i.e. any type
of mission to a target planet of no biological interest. In effect no
protection of such planets is warranted and no planetary protection
requirements are imposed.	 j
i
Category II missions comprise all types of missions to those target
s
	 planets for which there is minimal biological interest and an opinion among the
scientific community that there is a remote chance of contamination carried by
a spacecraft or associated hardware ,jeopardizing a future biological
experiment. The requirements are for simple documentation only. Flight
projects will be required to prepare a short Planetary Protection Plan
primarily to outline intended or potential impact targets, brief pre- and
post-launch analyses detailing impact strategies, and a post-encounter or
end-of-mission report which will provide the location of impact if such an
event occurs.
Category III missions comprise some missions to a target planet of
biological interest or for which scientific opinion provides a significant
chance of contamination Jeopardizing a future biological experiment. ';he
types of requirements will consist of documentation (more involved than
Category II) and some implementing procedures including trajectory biasing, the
use of cleanrooms during spacecraft assembly and testing, and occasionally
bioburden reduction. Although no impact is intended for Category III missions,
an inventory of bulk constituent organics will be required if an impact
occurs.
Category IV missions comprise some missions to a target planet of
biological interst or for wnich scientific opinion provides a significant
chance of contamination jeopardizing future biological experiment. Category IV
is the subset of such missions where direct contact with the target planet at
issue is intended. Requirements imposed will include rather detailed
documentation (more involved than Category III), an increased number of
implementing procedures, a bioassay to enumerate the bioburden, a probability
of contamination analysis and an inventory of the bulk constituent organics.
The in-lementing procedures required would include trajectory biasing,
cleanrooms, bioload reduction, possibly partial sterilization of the direct
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contact hardware and a bioshield for that hardware. Generally the requirements
and compliance will be similar to Viking, with the likely exception of complete
lander/probe sterilization.
Category V missions comprise all Earth return missions. The concern for
these missions is the protection of the terrestrial system, the Earth an.l the
Moon. (The Moon must be protected from back contamination to retain freedom
from planetary protection requirements on Earth-1400n travel.) For the set of
planets deemed by the scientific community to have no indigenous life forms, a
special subcategory "safe for Earth return" is defined. Missions in this
subcategory will have planetary protection requirements on the outbound phase
only, corresponding to the ca' ,.:jory of that phase (typically category I or II).
Such flight projects will have to formally request this categorization from the
Chief, Planetary Protection Program. For all other Category V missions,...the
highest degree of concern is expressed by the absolute prohibition of impact,
the need for sterilization of returned hardware which directly contacted the
target planet, and the need for containment of any unsterilized sample
co'lected and returned to Earth. In general this concern is reflected in a
range of requirements that encompasses those of Category IV plus a continuing
monitoring of project activities and pre-project studies and research (e.g., in
remote sterilization procedures and containment techniques). The requirements
for the protection of Earth have been and continue to be the subject of a
number of studies which will eventually lead to their detailed definition.
From the definitions of the categories, it is clear that all possible
target planets must be assigned a planetary protection priority. The proposed
prioritization, according to biological interest and contamination concern, is
based on the best available scientific ,judgement. The overall development of
proposed categories is summarized and the proposed priorities of the planets
are presented in they accompanying table, "Proposed Categories for Planets and
Types of Missions."
The implementation of the proposed policy will adopt a more direct yet
less generic means of levying requirements. It will be more direct because it
will establish requirements by target planet/mission class combinations, and
less eneric because it will utilize more specific and more numerous categories
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than existing implementation. There will be no baseline requirements across
categories either in terms of documentation or hardware requirements.
Additionally, because the new policy is not quantitatives there will be
categories of planet/missions with no quantitative requirements. Under the new
policy, quantitative requirem*nts will be levied exceptionally on those
planet/mission combinations which warrant them. It is anticipated that only
the combination involving Mars and Earth will be the exceptions. As is the
case with existing implementation procedures, a revised version of NHB 8020.12A
will be the govLrning document.
The new policy and its implementation will assign clear, direct roles and
responsibilities to the Associate Administrator for Space Science and the
Planetary Protection Officer to ensure that NASA's Planetary Protection Program
is a program of the agency and not any of its parts.
A series of reviews and presentations regarding the new planetary
protection policy will be conducted prior to the preparation of formal NASA
documents defining the policy and assigning responsibility for its execlotion.
The new NASA poiicy will be presented to the international community during
COSPAR's 1982 meeting in Ottawa, Canada.
The major impact of the proposed planetary protection policy will be in
the implementation are+ methods of compliance by future planetary missions.
Specific spacecraft missions currently under consideration include: Galileo, a
comet fly-by or encounter, International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM), Venus
Orbiting Imaging Radar (VOIR), Saturn Orbiter with Twin Probes (SOP2), and a 	
±II
Mars Surface Sample Return Mission (MSSK). Because NASA has determined that 	 i
all future planetary spacecraft will be launched by the Space Transportation
System (STS), it is important to evaluate the proposed polity in light of the
1
nea launch system.
Under the proposed policy, Galileo Project would be a Category I1
mission. No contamination control procedures would be required for planetary
protection. However, the Project would be encouraged to provide some
contamination control in its own interest. There would be a requirement to
document for the record the planned contamination control and to reference the
expected contamination impact (microbial load) of STS operations.
xiii
rAny cometary mission (except for a sample return mission) would be placed
in Category II under the new policy, thereby resolving the issue of
classification for this type of mission which currently exists. The general
requirements would be for documentation only. A cometary sample return
	
mission would be a Category V mission, and unless declared "safe for Earth 	
r
return" would be required to comply with all planetary protection provisions of
that Category (See following section on MSSR).
The ISPM would also be a Category II mission. There would be no
requirement for any analyses, assay or contamination control. Again, the
general requirements would be for documentation only.
	
Under the proposed policy, VOIR would also be placed in Category II. 	 I
There would be no requirements for analyses, assays, contamination control or
microbial burden reduction. Documentation requirements would apply.
A Saturn orbiter with twin probes would be a Category II mission
requiring documentation only. The detailed documents would be similar to that
of Galileo.
Because MSSR is a mission where a spacecraft is landed on Mars and part
or all of the landed hardware is returned to Earth, it must comply with
planetary protection provisions which pertain to the protection of future
science at Mars and to the protection of Earth against back contamination.
Therefore, MSSR would be a Category V mission. Requirements for the outbound
portion of the mission will be similar to those imposed on and implemented by
the Viking Project, with the possible exception of sterilization of the
complete lander/probe.
Generally, the outbound phase of an MSSR mission will be favorably
impacted by the new planetary protection policy. Requirements will be somewhat
relaxed from those imposed on Viking under the old policy and implementation.
The other two phases of the mission (sample acquisition/delivery and
science/quarantine investigations) will be seriously impacted by the new
policy noz in relative terms, since there never was a formal policy addressing
those phases, but in terms of the anticipated range of requirements deemed
essential for affording Earth the same protection, at the very least, as is
xiv
rprovided for planets of interest. The extent of this impact on an MSSR project
will depend on the severity of specific requirements to be developed in the
near future.
For missions where the policy requires either a microbiological assay or
a microbial burden reduction, the features of the STS ground and launch
operations pose a problem. For Category III missions, the requirement for
passive bioload control in the face of an STS launch will be definitely
reflected in the PP implementing issuances. In this case, not only must the
expected contamination due to standard STS operations have been previously
determined (as needed for Category II), but also the efficacy of special
contamination control procedures. These contamination control procedures would
be documented as requirements in the implementing issuances for STS launched
Category III missions.
For Category IV and Category V missions, the obvious recommendation is
the requirement of a contamination shroud. This is a severe and costly
requirement, but the only logical choice.
One final impact of the proposed policy on planetary missions is
concerned with the protection of science instruments. In the past, the
Planetary Protection Program has provided contamination control, cleaning and
sterilization for certain biological instruments on an exceptional basis,
specificially for the Viking mission. Under the proposed policy, the Planetary
Protection Program will have no responsibility for, and will not provide,
contamination control or bioburden reduction services for science payloads. In
addition, the Planetary Protection Program will not be responsible for any
damage to scientific instruments or for any morphological, chemical or
biological changes in a returned sample caused by the project's implementation
of planetary protection requirements.
The following table summarizes the proposed planetary protection policy
and requirements, and highlights the key differences from the present program.
xv
Comparison of Existing and Proposed
Planetary Protection Policy
DEFINITION/REQUIREMENTS EXISTING CONDITIONS NEW IMPLEMENTATION
n Classification of o Missions are classified o Missions are classified
Missions by mission type only by mission type/target
(except Class 1) planet combinations
o General PP Requirements o Apply to all missions o Apply only to those
except tVse to the missions to Mars,
Sun and Mercury and returning to Earth
o Documentation Requirements o Apply to all missions o Detail required for
missions to Mars, and
returning to Earth only.
Brief for other missions,
except none for Sun,
Mercury and Pluto.
o Biological Assays o Apply to all missions o Apply only to those
except t	 se to the missions to Mars,
Sun and Mercury and returning to Earth.
o Quantitative Requirements o Probabilistic in nature. o For the most part
Apply co all missions nonprobablistic.
except those to the Sun Apply only to missions
and Mercury to Mars, and returning
to Earth.
o Expression of Degree o Probability of growth lo Range of requirements
of Concern
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t
4	 REVIEW OF PRESENT POLICY
Protection of celestial environments has been of scientific concern since
it became technologically feasible to exp' the cosmos. With the accomplish-
ment of space travel, man had to consider the possibility that undesirable life
forms may follow him through his journeys. This concern over planetary
contamination resulted in an international program of planetary protection
which produced concomitant planetary protection requirements.
The development of existing planetary protection policy began in 1956
with the earliest attempts to prevent lunar and planetary contamination
occurring at the VIIth International Congress of the International Astronauti-
cal Federation. From these early beginnings, a program designed to prevent
contamination of the moon and planets by terrestrial microorganisms was
established and implemented through various international and national policy
statements, implementing issuances, and requirements covering space
exploration.
A.	 HISTORY OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT
With the launch of Sputnik 1, the Soviet Union stunned the world and
thrust entirely novel problems upon mankind. Subsequent to the international
concern expressed over the harmful effects of planetary contamination resulting
from space exploration, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) established
the Space Science Board (SSB) to "serve as the focal point for the interests
and responsibilities of the Academy-Research Council in space science" (1).
The SSB considered various problems concerned with the detection of extrater-
restrial life and the prevention of planetary contamination with terrestrial
organisms. In March, 1958, the Council of the NAS adopted and presented the
following resolutions to the International Congress of Scientific Unions
-1-
(ICSU) (2):
The launching of IGY satellites has opened space
to exploration. Accordingly, attempts to reach
the noon and planets can be anticipated, with
reasonable confidence, within the foreseeable
future.
The National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America urges that scientists plan
lunar and p?anetary studies with great care and
deep concern so that initial operations do not com-
promise and make impossible forever after critical
scientific experiments. For example, biological or
radioactive contamination of extraterrestrial
objects would easily occur unless initial space
activities be carefully planned and conducted with
extreme care.	 The National Academy of Sciences
will endervor to plan lunar or planetary
experiments in which the Academy participates so as
to prevent contamination of celestial objects in a
way that would impair the unique and powerful
scientific opportunities that might be realized in
subsequent scientific exploration.
The Council of the National Academy of Sciences
of the United States of America urges the Interna-
tional Council of Scientific Unions to encourage
and assist the evaluation of possibilities of such
contamination and the development of means for its
prevention. The Council of the Academy also
requests the International Council of Scientific
Unions to do whatever else it may to preserve and
foster the unaffected potentialities of space
research.
In presenting this statement, the NAS expressed its concern with the
problems of celestial contamination resulting from space exploration, and
pointed out the necessity for international cooperation to prevent alteration
or destruction of extraterrestrial life forms.
In response to this request, the ICSU established an ad hoc committee on
Contamination by Extraterrestrial Exploration (CETEX). This group
is
-2-
recommended and urged acceptance of a code of conduct aimed at achieving a
compromise between all-out space exploration and maximum protection of celes-
tial bodies for future scientific studies. It also recommended that
responsibility for overseeing planetary quarantine be placed with the newly
formed ICSU Committee on Space Research (COSPAR).
In acceptance of this responsibility, COSPAR requested the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. to consider ways of avoiding contamination of celestial bodies. Fol-
lowing the request, numerous studies were performed that dealt with biological
contamination, the survival of microorganisms in extraterrestrial environments,
and means for the prevention of contamination. Foremost among these studies
was a report by Davies and Comuntzis (3) which concluded that the problems of
contamination should be viewed within the context of probabilities. Other
studies and discussions centered around the probabilities of microbial survival
in extraterrestrial environments, the need and techniques of sterilizing inter-
planetary vehicles, and contamination risks of space exploration.
Several papers (4,5,6,1,8) having important implications for guidelines
concerning contamination control proposed mathematical models on which to base
the probability of contamination and subsequent sterilization standards. Sagan
and Coleman (9) analyzed the probability of planetary contamination and sug-
gested sterilization standards based on the belief that: 1) there is little
chance that life will be found on every mission, 2) accidental landing on the
planet's surface may constitute a contamination hazard, and 3) biological con-
tributions made by landers are greater than those made by flybys and orbiters.
As a result of these studies the SSB recommended minimizing biological contam-
ination of the moon to the extent technically feasible and established a proba-
bility of contaminating Mars during unmanned flight at 10-4.
The COSPAR Resolution 26.5 was adopted at the 1964 COSPAR meeting. Using
the Sagan-Coleman analytical model of contamination (9), the resolution
accepted (10)
-3-
....as tentatively recommended interim objectives,
; * sterilization level such that the probability of
a single viable organism aboard any spacecraft
intended for planetary landing or at^ospheric
penetration would be less than 1 x 10' , and a
probability limit for accidental planetary impact
by ungteri 1 i zed flyby or orbiting spacecraft of 3
x 10" or less.
Hall and Lyle (11) observed that COSPAR Resolution 26.5 was a
...milestone in -that for the first time, there was
international agreement on quantitative objectives
in terms of probabilities of events which
characterize planetary contamination. An
analytical rationale thus was provided for the
recommended standards and the quarantine problem
as it was understood at that time. Although
particulars of the COSPAR Resolution of 1964 have
been reconsidered in the light of increasing
knowledge, it provided a framework which continues
to serve in the development of quarantine
standards.	 The essential elements of the
framework are:	 (1) a model of the principal
parameters	 and	 their	 inter-relations;	 (2)
agreements as to which parameters should serve as
basic	 standards;	 and	 (3)	 assignment	 of
quantitative values to the chosen parameters.
Although the United States Planetary Quarantine Program was implemented
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in response to the
COSPAR requirements, the first formal NASA policy directive concerning protec-
tion of celestial bodies was issued in October 1959 by Dr. Abe Silverstein.
This directive, in the form of letters, stated the following (12):
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
has been considering the problem of sterilization
of payloads that might impact a celestial body.
Consideration was given to scientific questions,
engineering problems, NASA's responsibility towards
protecting scientific investigations into space,
and the reputation and integrity of the United
States. As a result of the deliberations, it has
been established as a NASA policy that payloads
which might impact a celestial body must be
sterilized before launching.
-4-
Ranger, the first U.S. lunar flight project, was beset with difficulties.
The series of failures aroused protest with claims that sterilization was in
part responsible. A further directive on the subject "Decontamination and
sterilization procedures for lunar and planetary space vehicles" was issued by
T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, NASA, in December 1960. The directive stated
that "effective decontamination and sterilization procedures for lunar and
planetary space vehicles are essential." A change in policy was not issued
until September 1963, when NASA issued its Management Manual NMI-4-4-1, "NASA
Unmanned Spacecraft Decontamination Policy" (13). The management instruction
stated that "cleanroom assembly policies be adapted, sporocidal agents be used
when 'appropriate' to reduce surface contamination, ar final assembly be wrap-
ped and handled in such a way as to prevent accumulation of contamination
during its shipment to the launch site" (14). Lunar spacecraft sterilization
policies were thus abandoned and replaced by quarantine policies designed to
prevent terrestrial contamination of the lunar samples and the possible
introduction of alien life forms to the Earth's biosphere. Planetary missions
continued to require sterilization.
NASA policy directives concerned with back-contamination and extrater-
restrial exposure, as well as authority to deal with any cases which might	 i
occur, were implemented through NPD 8020.13 (15), NPD 8020.14 (16), NMD/A
8020.15 (17) and NMD/M 8020.16 (18). These provisions were designed to: 1)
protect the Earth's biosphere from alien life forms, and 2) protect lunar
samples from terrestrial contamination.
On September 6, 1967 NASA NMI-4-4-1 was replaced by NASA Policy Directive
8020.7, "Outbound Spacecraft: Basic Policy Relating to Lunar and Planetary
Contamination Control" (19). This document stated that "Microbial life landed
on the Moon... shall be identified, quantified and, insofar as possible,
located [sited]". This would ensure that if life were found in returned
samples, it could be identified as terrestrial.
In 1967 the United States became a signatory to an international treaty
(20) which states in part that: "The basic probability of one in one thousand
(1 x 103 ) that a planet of interest will be contaminated shall be used as a
f	
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a criterion during the period of biological exploration..." .he basic
contamination control policy for planetary missions appeared in NPD 8020.10
(21) and was updated by NPD 8020.10A, "Outbound Planetary Biological and
Organic Contamination Control: Policy and Responsibility" (22). The following
provision was contained in both of these documents:
Biological Contamination.
	 The kasic probability
or one n one thousand (1 x 10- 3 ) that a planet
of biological interest will be contaminated
shall be used as the guiding criterion during the
period of biological exploration of Mars, Venus,
Mercury, Jupiter, other planets and their satel-
lites that are deemed important for the explora-
tion of life,
	 life precursors or remnants
thereof.
Planetary contamination by organic constituents was also addressed in NPD
8020.10A (22) by the following:
Organic Contamination. In order to assist in
t enterpret^onoff- the results of future scien-
tific experiments, control of organic contamination
shall be limited to accountability for organic
materials deposited on a planet by a flight mission.
This provided that planetary conditions would be preserved for future
organic constituent exploration as well as for biological exploration, and
placed certain constraints concerned with organic material identification on
flight projects. In other words biological interest in a planet was construed
to include the concern for pre-biotic organic and remnant finds, as well as the
classical search for indigenous life forms.
In accordance with NPD 8020.7 (19) and NPD 8020..JA (22), NHB
8020.12 (23) and later NHB 8020.12A, "Quarantine Provisions for Unmanned Extra-
terrestrial Missions" (24) established basic NASA requirements for the biologi-
cal quarantine of celestial bodies. In line with international agreements,
this document spoke in terms of the probability of contamination.
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B.	 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The authority for implementation of national planetary protection policy
f	 resides with NASA, while basic responsibility for the program lies with the
Associate Administrator for Space Science (19) as shown in Figure 1. Within
this office, responsibility has been delegated to the Life Sciences Division
(Figure 2). Although no formal documentation exists to such an effect, a
direct line of communication has also been provided between the Planetary
Protection Officer and the Associate Administrator, Office of Space Science.
This organization has been alluded to, and practiced, in working relations for
many years. The most recent example is the appointment of a Planetary Quaran-
tine Officer directly by the Associate Administrator for Space Science (25).
This organization provides a measure of autonomy from the Life Science Division
and confers authority over flight programs.
In carrying out his responsibilities, the Planetary Protection Officer
ensures compliance with NASA requirements established in NHB 8020.12A. As
shown in Figure 3, planning, review, documentation and scheduling is establish-
ed by this document.
The Planetary Quarantine Plan is tiie primary planning document describing
how a planetary flight project will be conducted so as to avoid exceeding its
planetary contamination allocation (expressed on the basis of probability).
Based upon the type of mission and the total number of flights estimated to be
conducted during the period of biological interest, the NASA Planetary Protec-
tion Officer allocates a portion of the U.S. share (by COSPAR resolution, 0.44
x 10-3
 for each planet of interest) to each unmanned planetary mission.
The planning document then includes a statement of mission class, the alloca-
t+on for each planet involved in the mission, a mission description, the
project suballocation to different mission hardware or phases (optional), a
management plan, a list of pertinent documents, a list of facilities important
in assuring planetary protection, and a schedule for planetary protection
plins, reviews and documentation to be generated.
-7-
ASSOCIATE ADMINSTRATOR FOR
................
SPACE SCIENCE
ASTROPHYSICS AND SOLAR	 LIFE SCIENCE
	
TERRESTRIAL DIVISION	 DIVISION
PLANETARY PROTECTION
SOLAR SYSTEMS	 I	 I	 IPROGRA14 ANALYSIS
	
EXPLORATION DIVISION1 	 I	 DIVISION
Figure 1. Organization of the Office of Space Science
t
i
LIFE SCIENCE DIVISION
	
OPERATIONAL MEDICINE I (RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
	
FLIGHT PROGRAMS
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH
	
SPACE BIOLOGY	 !
EXOBIOLOGY AND PLANETARY PROTECTION
Figure 2. Organization of the Life Science Division,
Office of Space Science
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In order to demonstrate compliance with planetary protection provisions,
a Probability of Contamination Analysis Plan is submitted which shows how
analyses will be performed to demonstrate compliance with the mission
allocation and identifies all potential sources or mechanisms of contamination.
The plan also includes what analyses will be performed, what formulas will be
used, and the values of certain parameters used. One of the formulas currently
used to calculate the likelihood of contaminating a planet by direct impact of
the spacecraft is:
Pc =	 mi(o).P(vt).P(uv).P(a).P(sa).P(r).P(g)
i
where the typical parameters are:
Pc	 The pr `#,0i 1 i ty of contamination
mi(o)	 The initial microbial burden (at launch, after decontamination)
P(vt)
	
The probability of surviving space vacuum-temperature
P(uv)
	
The probability of surviving uv space radiation
P(a)	 The probability of arriving at the planet
P(sa)
	
The probability of surviving atmospheric entry
P(r)	 The probability of release
P(g)	 The probability of growth.
The parameters used in this or other analyses may be specified by the
Planetary Protection Officer, suggested and substantiated by the project, Pr
taken from the NASA Planetary Quarantine Parameter Specification Book. Tha
latter specifications were established through 1) research supported by the
Planetary Protection Program, 2) recommendations of the Space Science Board,
and 3) recommendations of the Planetary Quarantine Advisory Panel.
b
t
Two further requirements are imposed on unmanned planetary flight
projects dependent on the mission class (Table 1): 1) microbiological assays,
and 2) microbial reduction. For missions to which these requirements apply
(mission classes 3 and 4), appropriate planning documents must be prepared.
Microbiological assays are conducted during assembly of the spacecraft to
enumerate the biological "burden" of the spacecraft and to ensure that the
probability of planetary contamination will not exceed its allocation.
-11-
Typically, when estimates in the Probability of Contamination Analysis
Plan indicates that a precise value of the microbial burden is needed (or for
classes where assay is required), the flight project is required to conduct
microbiological assays and must submit a Microbiological Assay Plan to the
Planetary Protection Officer for approval. This document must identify the
space vehicle hardware, facilities, and associated environments which are
subject to assay, and demonstrate compliance with implementation procedures
which appear in NHB 5340.1B, "NASA Standard Procedures for the Microbiological
Examination of Space Hardware" (26). Quality assurance procedures used to
ensure validity of assay results must also be described in the Plan.
Table 1. Designations of Mission Classes for
Planetary Protection Purposes (22).
Mission Class	 Mission Examples
1	 Solar
Me rcu ry
2	 Planet Flyby
Gravitational Swingbys
Planet Satellite Flybys
Comet Flybys
3	 Planet Probes
Planet Landers
4	 Sample Return from Planets
or other Solar System Bodies
12
In order to meet Pc constraints, reduction of the microbial burden may
be necessary. Microbial reduction involves hardware elements that must have
their biological load reduced to a specified or measured level and is typically
required due to estimates arrived at in the Probability of Contamination Analy-
sis Plan. A Microbial Reduction Plan is required of all missions where the
cleanliness level is critical (classes 3 and 4). The document includes the
rationale for reducing the biological "burden," identification of the space-
craft hardware that is subject to microbial reduction processes, process
analysis and verification and control, and a description of the methods for
maintaining a reduced microbial level. The preferred method for achieving
microbial load reduction is referred to as a "dry heat" cycle; i.e., a speci-
fied elevated temperature of a specified gaseous atmosphere for a specified
length of time. Alternate methods such as chemical or radiation techniques may
be proposed.
These plans (as required) are all submitted to the Planetary Protection
Officer for review. Approval of the documents constitutes approval of the
parameters developed and the methods proposed by a project for meeting
planetary protection constraints.
To ensure that planetary protection activities are proceeding properly
and in accordance with the planning documents, and to document compliance with
planetary protection requirements, a project must accomplish a series of
reviews and submit various. reports to the Planetary Protection Officer.
A Pre-Launch Planetary Quarantine Review is conducted to ascertain that a
flight project has met its planetary protection requirements to date, and to
examine in detail related activities accomplished prior to the review. This
!	 review is based upon the Pre-Launch Analysis of Probability of Planetary
Contamination document which includes a computation of the probability of
contaminating the target planet based on the P. allocation of the mission.
This document also identifies all deviations from previously submitted plans,
summarizes significant analytical and laboratory results relevant to demon-
strating compliance with planetary protection constraints, identifies potential
planetary protection violations which could occur throughout the mission, and
verifies proper application of microbial reduction processes (as applicable).
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Prior to the actual launch of the vehicle, a Launch Readiness Review,
which includes planetary protection as a topic on the agenda, is held by a
project. Significant planetary protection events, problems and changes which
have occurred since the last review, as well as open action items, are
addressed in this review.
A brief summary document, a Post Launch Analysis of Compliance with
COSPAR Recommendations, based on the Pre-Launch Analysis of Probability of
Planetary Contamination is submitted to indicate the degree to which the
mission meets the overall planetary protection requirements through launch and
early post-launch events.
In the case of multi-target planet missions, a Post-Encounter Analysis is
performed to ensure continuing compliance with planetary protection
requirements. This supplemental report to the Post Launch Analysis re-assesses
the probability of contaminating the planet to be encountered next in light of
events which occurred during encounter and early post-encounter events of the
completed planet encounter. It might also be construed to be an end-of-
project report for the portion of the mission completed.
A supplement to the Post Launch Analysis of Compliance with COSPAR
Recommendations is submitted at the formally declared end-of-project. This
document addresses the degree to which a mission has met planetary protection
requirements throughout the complete mission.
-14-
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SECTION II
OBSOLESCENCE OF PRESENT POLICY
There are at least four major reasons why changes in existing policy or
adoption of a new policy should be considered. These are: 1) the results of
reassessment of the hazards of biological contamination of celestial bodies by
the scientific community, 2) the impact of planetary exploration during the
1970-1980 decade, 3) the obsolescence of mathematical models in deriving
planetary protection constraints, particularly the use of P(g), and 4)
consideration of the exploration rate and types of missions for the 1980's.
Although these reasons are stated separately, all are in fact closely related
and interdependent.
A.	 REASSESSMENT OF HAZARDS
The current policy was adopted at a time when the philosophy for
approaches to planetary exploration was conservative. With the newly acquired
capability of exploring the planets by remote probes, an historic opportunity
had been made available to the biological sciences, that is: the opportunity
to test fundamental questions about the origin and development of life in a
planetary system (27). There was great concern by many ranking biologists that
this unique scientific opportunity might be lost irretrievably if terrestrial
microflora or organic materials were allowed to contaminate the planets. It
was thought that this might occur by disruption of planetary ecologies through
pathogenicity or competitive displacement, or by implanting terrestrial species
that might adapt and proliferate in local ecologies thereby perpetually
confusing later investigations (28).
Admittedly the probability was small that this kind of contamination
would result in destruction of critical scientific information. However, it
was felt that the great importance of the scientific rewards balanced a low
probability of scientific loss (29).
i
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t
	 This con nervative position was prompted by the relatively limited
knowledge of conditions on planetary bodies as well as uncertainties about the
limits of adaptability of terrestrial microorganisms to environmental extremes
different from those existing on Earth. Furthermore, there was not time prior
to starting exploration to execute appropriate Earth-based biological research
programs that would more precisely evaluate the true risks of damaging
subsequent biological investigations of the planets. The pursuit of such 	 s
projects would have delayed the exploration program for many years. It seemed
necessary at the time to compensate for insufficient knowledge by adopting a
highly conservative policy.
This philosophy has now changed due partly to findings of the planetary
exploration program over the past ten years, recent reassessments by the Space
Science Board Committee on Planetary Biology and Chemical Evolution, and the
obvious need to relieve unnecessary burdens on flight projects whenever
possible. Thus, there is a strong need to make the NASA planetary protection
policy consistent with current knowledge and beliefs.
B.	 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF THE PLANETARY EXPLORATION PROGRAM RELEVANT TO
PLANETARY PROTECTION
1.	 Mercury and the Moon
Surface conditions on Mercury and the Moon have many similarities
with respect to temperature, atmosphere, thermal inertia, impact craters and
radiation. Radiation fluxes on Mercury are higher than on the Moon, of course,
due to its closeness to the Sun. Data from Mariner 10 significantly advanced
the state of knowledge about Mercury, particularly with regard to surface
characteristics, atmospheric composition, magnetic fields and optical and
surface thermal properties (30).
Neither the Kjon nor Mercury has ever been of great biological interest
because of the lack of a significant atmosphere, high thermal fluxes and high
y
	
	 ultra-violet radiation levels. The new data from Mariner 10 reaffirmed this
conclusion for Mercury. At one time it was suggested that the moon might be
4	 ^
t
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a repository for past biotic or pre-biotic processes or it might provide an
opportunity to test the panspermi hypothesis (31). But after several lunar
projects including Ranger, Lunar Orbiter, Surveyor and finally Apollo, there
now seems to be little hope that the Moon can provide any clues to solving
fundamental biological problems, except perhaps by extensive sub-surface
investigations. Thus, other than some care in preventing possible chemical
contamination that might confound a subsequent planetary investigation there is
no explicit planetary protection requirement for the Moon and no change is
contemplated.
2.	 Venus
A wealth of new information has accumulated about Venus over the
past ten years as a result of measurements taken with Earth-based instruments,
fly-bys, orbiters and atmospheric/surface probes including Venera 5 through 12,
Mariner 10 and Pioneer Venus 1 and 2. The information includes temperature
	 t
profiles from the upper atmosphere to the surface, composition, structure and	
l
dynamics of the lower, middle and upper atmosphere, composition and distribu-
tion of cloud layers and surface properties.
Elevated temperatures at the planets' surface and in the lower atmosphere
almost completely exclude the planet from being biologically interesting. A
range of temperatures compatible with terrestrial biology occurs in the
atmosphere between about 48 to 60 kilometers where pressures are 1.3 to 0.2
earth atmospheres (32).
Most of the main cloud deck is between these altitudes (33). Besides
major components CO2
 and N2(8), the atmosphere contains aerosol fractions
believed to be mostly sulfuric acid droplets with other as yet undefined phases
(33). The abundance of measured water vapor is consistent with that in
equilibrium with approximately 85 percent sulfuric acid solution (34).
Conceivably, sulfuric acid is a sink for atmospheric water.
-17-
The current value of P(g) for the Venusian atmosphere (which predates
the exploratory missions discussed above) allows for the remote possibility of
growth of terrestrial microorganisms. However, the latest data suggest that
the possibility of growth of terrestrial microorganisms in Venusian clouds is
perhaps even more remote than previously estimated. Only highly specialized,
and no doubt rare, species could possibly adapt to an environment where it
would grow in aerosols, be unaffected by, or perhaps utilize high sulfate
concentrations at a very low pH, and grow at low water activities. The
possibility of finding such an organism on Earth, collecting it on a spacecraft
and transporting a sufficiently large population to successfully innoculate the 	 i
Venus atmosphere seems extremely remote, indeed. A review of the planetary
protection requirements for the atmosphere of Venus by the SSB is needed 	 i
because the body of more recent information would be expected to reduce the
requirements for the atmosphere to a level comparable to those for the surface
of the planet.
3.	 Mars
Viking results especially related to biological questions ana
planetary protection include those from global surface temperature
measurements, atmospheric water vapor determinations, observations of
hydrologic surface formations, atmospheric composition, analysis of surface
material for organic chemicals, and attempts to directly detect life.
Kieffer et al. (35) performed extensive global thermal mapping studies of
the Martian surface. Surface temperatures of 130 to 290 K are reported. No
local hot spots, such as those produced by active volcanism were observed.
A detailed model of the dynamics of global atmospheric water distribution
was developed by farmer et al. (36). Water vapor appears to be in equilibrium
with subsurface ice residing at depths of 0.1 to 1 meter and at latitudes
greater than about 46 0 north and 35 0 south. Because of low surface
temperatures the vapor level is small, the maximum observed being only 100
micrometers of precipitable water.
-18-
aConsiderable evidence for water-ice at the surface and in the subsurface
was obtained. Besides the implications of seasonal variations of atmospheric
water vapor gust mentioned, an extensive array of hydrological surface
formations were observed, ranging from various types of surface disruptions to
large channels with apparent fluvial patterns (37). The release of 0.1 to 1%
water upon pyrolysis of soil samples (38) also indicated the presence of
crystalline bound surface water. No liquid water was detected, and was not
expected due to the extremely low temperatures and pressures.
Constituents of the atmosphere of biological interest were determined
r	 both by mass spectroscopy (39) and gas chromatography (40), both analyses being
in good agreement. Nitrogen was of particular biological interest because the
existence of life depends on its availability. The analyses gave: carbon
dioxide 95.32%, nitrogen 2.7%, oxygen 0.13%, carbon monoxide 0.07% and water
vapor approximately 0.03%.
Surface samples collected from different locations surrounding the Viking
landers were analyzed for the presence of organic compounds by pyrolysis-gas
chromatography-mass spectrometry (38). Although maximum sensitivity of the
system was about 1 part per billion, no indigenous organic matter was
detected.
Two of the three life detection experiments yielded responses that were
considered consistent with biological activity. The third experiment (40),
designed to measure the biological gas exchange of soil microorganisms,
detected a burst of molecular oxygen when a soil sample was exposed to an
atmosphere saturated with water vapor at approximately 15°C . The amount of
oxygen released was considerably greater than could be expected from simple
r desorption of atmospheric gas. The decomposition of an oxygen containing
compound seemed more likely. From this result it was hypothesized that a
strong oxidizing agent existed in the surface material, presumably a peroxide
€	
or supero;cide. The hypothesis was, of course, consistent with the absence of
$	 organic matter.
Of the two experiments that obtained positive results, one was designed
to detect biological oxidation of added organic compounds (41) while the other
detected reduction of carbon dioxide or carbon monoxide by soil organisms (42).
-19-
Due to the apparent existence of a strong oxidant, and the absence of organic
material in the surface, the results of the life detection experiments were
considered to have been induced by chemical rather than biological processes
(43).
The results summarized above were those mainly considered by the Space
Science board in recommending new values of P(g) for Mars (44). the surface
temperature distribution, the absence of liquid water, the absence of organics
and the inferred presence of a strong oxidant in the soil led to a reduction in
P(g). A new policy should contain requirements that are consistent with those
recommendations.
4.	 The Outer Planets and Their Satellites
The outer planets are Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune and Pluto.
Other than Titan none of the satellites of the outer planets are of particular
biological interest. The planets themselves, however, are interesting because
of detectable amounts of organic compounds in their atmospheres.
The Committee on Planetary biology and Chemical Evolution has performed a
careful analysis of the possibility of a terrestrial organism growing in any of
the outer planet environments (44). Their conclusion was that the chance is
nil. This determination was based on models of the atmospheres of Jupiter,
Saturn, Uranus and Neptune developed by Weidenschilling and Lewis (45) and an
assessment of microbial growth under the most favorable conditions predicted by
these models.
This study was performed three to four years prior to the encounters of
the Pioneer and Voyager spacecraft with Jupiter and Saturn. Although no new
data affecting biological interest in Jupiter or Saturn was obtained by these
missions, new information on the atmosphere and temperatures of Titan
significantly affects the assessment of its planetary protection requirements.
The data consists of IR spectra showing the presence of hydrogen cyanide (46)
which had not been shown previously, a predominately nitrogen atmosphere (47),
(48) with a surface pressure of 1.6 bars and a temperature of 93 K. (-180°C)
I
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(48). These low temperatures render the possibility nil for the growth of
terrestrial organisms on Titan.
C.	 MATHEMATICAL MUDELS
It was stated previously that NASA is committed to conduct a planetary
protection program that limits contaminating a planet or satellite of
biological interest to a probability of 1 chance in 1000. To meet this
requirement a mathematical model was established that included various
probability parameters associated with events or conditions affecting the
deposition and establishment of terrestrial microbes on a target body. This
model is no longer useful or desirable because of reassessments of the danger
of contaminating planetary bodies and because of inherent weaknesses of the
model itself. The main weakness is the large uncertainty in assignins values
to the parameters, while the reassessments have resulted in recommendations for
P(g) values low enough to make planetary protection constraints unnecessary for
most missions.
The uncertainties in assigning values to the parameters of the model have
been particularly troublesome in the case of P(g) because its value can be
assigned with much less certainty than the other parameters, yet it dominates
the others in determining a value for the probability of contamination Pc.
Assigning values to the parameter P(g) was never popular with NASA's scientific
advisors, and these exercises tended to be carried out as a concession to
project engineers for designing missions and meeting quantitative requirements.
Although the most serious objection is the assignment of P(g), the values of
some of the other parameters used in the probability model also have a limited
experimental basis.
The Space Science Board's Committee on Planetary Biology and Chemical
Evolution strongly condemned the probability approach, particularly the use of
P(g), for establishing planetary pro t ection restrictions for each mission (44).
In their view, "The assignment of ntmerical probabilities to phenomena that are
qualitatively unknown is inappropriate. There is limited value in the assign-
ment of a probability between 0.0 and 1.0 of growth of a microorganism when
-21-
nothing is known about the identification and metabolic capabilities of the
organism, the size of the initial inoculum, the presence of associated
microorganisms, the aetails of the environment in question, and most important
the detailed changes in all of the relevant environmental factors with time."
They recommended an alternative approach be developed preferably based on
experimental data rather than generalized guesses.
Although the assignment of numerical values to P(g) is uncertain, the
trends if not the absolute values do reflect the degree of concern for the
protection of the various planets. Since the Space Science Board is well aware
of the application of their recommendations for values of P(g) to the
mathematical model, one may review the implications of its latest
	 j
recommendations in this regard. It seems clear that the Board and other
scientific advisors would prefer to recommend requirements for various planets
rather than values for P(g). Nevertheless, the most recently recommended
values for P(g) for Mars and the outer planets and satellites (44) are shown in
Table 2, along with earlier estimates (49) for Mercury and Venus.
The need for "active planetary protection (PPS methods", such as terminal
heat treatment to reduce bioloads, or less active "clean assembly", was
estimated using the current mathematical model and typical spacecraft
bioburdens and allocations (e.g. for Viking and Voyager). These considerations
indicate that active methods would be required for missions to planets with
assigned values greater than or equal to 10- 9
 for P(g). Missions to
planets with smaller P(g) values generally require clean assembly. However for
an assignment of either a nil P(g) or a value less than 10- 14 , no
planetary protection implementation is required.
The numerical value, less than 10- 14 , was proposed by the SSB for
the outer planets and their satellites only for satisfying NASA's commitment to
a mathematical demonstration of compliance with mission allocations. Wh:A the
value 10- 14
 is used for P(g) in the equation for determining P c , none
ie allocations currently existing would be exceeded, even by spacecraft
microbial burdens two orders of magnitude higher than typical burdens.
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Table 2. Existing and Recently Recmended Values of P(g)
0
BODY P(g) VALUE
NEED FOR ACTIVE	 ..
IMPLEMENTATION a
Mercury Ni 1 None
Venus Nil Surface None
10-9
 Atmosphere Active P.P. Methods
Mars 10'7 Residual Poiar Caps Active P.P. Methods
10'8
 Subsurface (sub-polar) Active P.P. Methods
10- 10
 Surface to 6 cm ( r ► .b-polar) Clean Assembly
Jupiter <10-14 None
Saturn <10-14 None
Uranus <10-14 None
Neptune (10-14 None
Moon Nil None
Satellites of the
outer planets	 (10'14
Titan	 10'10
None
Clean Assembly
i
t
3
i
4
i
c
i
i
a Based on estimates from prev;ous missions.
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The important implications of these assignments to P(g) under present
planetary protection policy are that only Mars, and possibly Venus, require
active bioburden reduction methods, the other planets and satellites requiring
at most clean room assembly. The second result is that the frequent assignment
of less than 10- 14
 for P(g) reduces the need for a mathematical model
since this eliminates planetary protection analysis for missions to those
planets.
Both the Space Science Board and COSPAR have recommended that spacecraft	
i
for missions to the outer planets be assembled under clean room conditions
comparable to the Viking Project (44,50). With a generalization from outer
planets tc all planets with very small P(g) values (i.e. nil) except those
declared to be of no biological interest (e.g., Mercury), this recommendation
introduces the concept of a minimum, or baseline, planetary protection
requirement. The intent of this recommendation was an effective requirement
that imposed no unreasonable constraints on the conduct of a planetary mission
and in fact would be beneficial to spacecraft system and science instrument
reliability. While the concept is useful, the reasonableness of the particular
requirement is arguable. Moreover, the reliability issue is not a Planetary
Protection Program matter. (See also the Appendix, "Science Instruments and
Planetary Protection Policy".)
This recommendation is an example of translating expert scientific
Judgement on planetary protection re quirements directly into practical
operational procedures without cloaking the Judgement in a semi-quantitative
form. This approach can also be used in defining planetary protection
requireaknts for Mars or other bodies requiring more stringent prk;::autions. It
would avoid the bothersont problem of assigning a numerical value to the
parameter P(g).
D.	 EFFECT OF MISSION MODELS
At the time the present policy was initiated major consideration was
being given to the exploration of Mars, primarily because it has an environment
apparently less hostile to the development of life than any other planet. Much
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rof the thinking about planetary protection was done with emphasis on Mars for
that reason. Although Mars is still of major interest, current mission models
postpone further exploration of it until the 1990's. Earlier missions are to
targets that should have minimal or no planetary protection constraints.
Although in principle policy should be independent of any mission model, in
practice the policy should at least be consistent with plans for future
missions. As mentioned earlier, the policy should treat Mars or other planets
of biological interest as exceptions and provide that all other missions should
have only minimal or no planetary protection constraints.
To summarize, the current policy requirements are no longer realistic.
,he considerations and scientific rationale leading to the establishment of the
current policy were probably overcautious, in retrospect. There has been an
enormous advance in our knowledge of the planets in the past 10 years, and some
of it has resulted in revised opinions about the risk of contamination to
future scientific missions. This is reflected in the latest recommended P(g)
values for Mars and the outer planets, the latter having been lowered to
extremely small values, actually nil, by the SSB. The new values of P(g) and
the obvious unreality of determining the real value of parameters, especially
P(g), in the mathematical model used in planetary protection, emphasize the
need for a more realistic approach. As a minimum a new policy should
deemphasize the mathematical approach by translating scientific judgements
directly into operational procedures and methods and should adopt suitable
planetary protection requirements for all missions to planets of biological
interest. Missions to Mars (and possibly Venus) that require active planetary
protection procedures should be treated as exceptions. Finally, the current
rate of planetary launches and the inflexibility of the current policy also
requires an improved, more liberal policy.
-25-
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SECTION III
THE PROPOSED POLICY
The proposed policy, like the current policy, addresses NASA concerns
for the preservation of "planetary conditions for future biological and organic
constituent exploration" (22) and for the protection against the "potential
hazards to Earth of future returning missions",(19). The principal revision of
the proposed policy is the elimination of the quantitative aspect of the
current policy, i.e.: "The basic probability of one in one thousand
(1x10- 3 ) that a planet of biological interest will be contaminated shall be
used as the guiding criterion during the period of biological
exploration..."(22). In view of this desired change and the necessity of the
change as presented in the previous section, the proposed basic policy might be
expressed in the tollowing manner:
Although the existence of i1fe elsewhere in the
solar system may be unlikely, the conduct of
scientific investigations of possible extrater-
restrial life forms, precursors and remnants must
not be jeopardized. In addition the Earth must be
protected from the potential hazard posed by
extraterrestrial matter carried by a spacecraft
returning from another planet. Therefore, for
certain space mission/target planet combinations,
controls on contamination shall be imposed, in ac-
cordance with issuances implementing this policy.
In addition to the elimination of the quantitative aspect of the current
policy, the proposed policy establishes two new major features by the phrase
"certain space mission/target planet combinations." The intentional use of the
word "certain" denotes that most space missions will be relieved of all
planetary protection requirements. That is, as a matter of policy, implementa-
tion will be accomplished on a "by exception" basis. Secondly, the identifica-
tion of those exceptional missions and the requirements imposed will be based
both on the target planet and the type of encounter (fly-by, orbiter, probe,
Lander, etc.). For planetary protection purposes, the term "planet" includes
the major planets, planet satellites, as well as other solar system bodies,
i.e. comets, asteroids, etc.
-26-
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The proposed policy thus seeks to incorporate the essentially negative
f	 findings on the existence of life in the solar system and to recognize that the
s	 planetary exploration program is quite limited, In a prudent manner. The con-
r	 cepts of mission/planet combinations and of implementation by exception are the
mechanisms proposed. The qualitative nature of the proposed policy remedies
the inherent difficulties in the determination of a probability of
i	 F
contamination based significantly on the probability of growth, to the greatest
s	extent feasible.,
t
The proposed policy and these major features are reflected in significant
changes in the implementation and requirements of Planetary Protection. This
matter will be developed further below.
A.	 DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED POLICY
A principal revision in the implementation under the proposed policy is
the introduction of categories of mission type/planet combinations. These
categories are similar to the mission classes of NHB 8020.12A(24). However,
there are now gradations of biological interest which are assigned to the
planets. Active biological interest denotes a declaration by the scientific
community that a specific planet may possess indigenous life forms, precursors
or remnants. Minimal biological interest allows for possible precursors or
remnants but denies the existence of indigenous life forms. No biological
interest denies the existence of all of these factors.
The basis for the logical construction of the categories follows from the
goals of the basic policy: the protection of the Earth from extraterrestrial
contamination and the protection of future life science at target planets. All
Earth return missions (those involving direct contact with extraterrestrial
planets followed by return-of spacecraft hardware to the terrestrial system)
are placed in categi ry V. Here the implementation and requirements are most
stringent, reflecting a high degree of concern. The degree of concern for the
protection of future life science at a target planet is based on the biological
interest in the planet, on the encounter type of the mssion, and the
-27-
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likelihood of a putative contamination event. All missions other than Earth
return missions are placed in categories for increasing degree of concern (I
through IV).
Category I essentially corresponds to the present class 1, i.e. any type
of mission to a target planet of no biological interest. In effect no
protection of such planets is warranted.
Category II missions comprise all types of missions to those target
planets for which there is minimal biological interest and an opinion among
the scientific community that there is a remote chance of contamination carried
by a spacecraft or associated hardware jeopardf-7 ing a future biological
experiment. In this context, contamination me-;ris the introduction of
terrestrial life forms, remnants or organic constituents on or in a spacecraft
or on an extraterrestrial planet. Biological experiment includes any of which
the stated or prudently interpreted objective is the investigation of
extraterrestrial life forms, precursors or remnants (i.e. includes both life
detection and organic constituent investigations). Category II represents
those missions for which the need for planetary protection cannot be totally
discounted.
Category III missions comprise some missions to a target planet of
biological interest or for which scientific opinion provides a significant
chance of contamination jeopardizing a future biological experiments. Category
III is limited to such missions where no direct contact (spacecraft hardware
contact with the body or permanent atmosphere) with the target planet at issue
is intended or planned. Thus the encounter types include fly-by and orbiter
(if the final planned disposition of the orbiter is to avoid or prevent impact
with the target planet).
Category IV missions comprise some missions to a target planet of
biological interest or for which scientific opinion provides a significant
chance of contamination jeopardizing future biological experiments. Category
IV is the subset of such missions where direct contact with the target planet
at issue is intended. Thus the encounter types include probe, land^r and
orbiter (if the final planned disposition of the orbiter is to allow an impact
with the target planet).
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Category V missions comprise all Earth return missions, as previously
stated. For the set of target planets deemed by the scientific community to
have no indigenous life forms a special subcategory "safe for Earth return"
would be defined. An existing example is a lunar sample return mission. Note
that this is a logically less severe restriction than a declaration of no
biological interest. However, it is expected that the former conclusion will
be approached much more conservatively. Missions that are Earth return and
directly contact only planets declared "safe for Earth return" would be placed
in this subcategory.
The logic diagram for the determination of the category of a specific
mission type/target planet combination is shown in Figure 4. For multiple
target planet missions, the correct category is the highest possible,
considering the various planets involved. Of course the detailed
implementation requirements will be relaxed at the lower priority targets.
In order to explicitly determine the category of a particular mission, the
planetary protection priority (i.e. the level of biological interest) of all
its target planets, as well as its type, is required. The definition of these
priorities and a proposed wssignment of all planets is provided in Table 3.
Priority A comprises the Sun, Moon, Mercury and Pluto. Tnese celestial
bodies have been determined to have no biopotential and hence are of no
biological interest. Priority B contains the outer planets (except Pluto) and
their satellites, comets and asteroids. Special attention is drawn to
inclusion of Venus and Titan into this priority. The probability of growth for
the atmosphere of Venus has been assigned since 1973 a value of 10- 9 which
can be interpreted as a minimal degree of interest. At the same time the
surface of the planet has been declared of no biological interest by the
assignment of a nil v,ilue. A reassessment, as recommended in an earlier part
of this report, of the atmosphere of Venus may remove Venus to priority A.
Titan has been assigned a probability of growth value of 10- 10 , again
reflecting minimal biological interest. As presented previously in this
report, the recent Voyager findings on the surface temperature of Titan support
an assignment of minimal interest (only). Accordingly priority B is
recommended here. The proposed priority of comets and asteroids is not based
on the published probabilities of growth; there are none. The priority B
-29-
Earth return mission?
No
Any target planet of	 No	 CATEGORY I
biological interest?]
Yes
Any target planet of
active biological
	 No	 CATEGORY II
interest or of
contaminaTTon concern?
Yes
Direct contact encounter
with target planet of	 No	 CATEGORY III
active biological
interest or of
contamination concern?
Yr^s
CATEGORY IV
Yes
All direct contact
target planets
	
CATEGORY V
safe for Earth return?
Safe  or
Earth Return
Yes
	
subcategory
Figure 4. Logic for the Determination of Mission Category
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Table 3. Planetary Protection Priorities of Target Planets
A	 No biological interest
B	 Minimal biological interest
and minimal contamination
concern
C	 Active biological interest
or significant contamination
concern
Sun, Moon, Mercury, Pluto
Venus, Jupiter, Saturn,
Uranus, Neptune, outer
planet satellites,
comets, asteroids and others
Ma rs
assignment is consistent with the possible existence of life precursors (of
special interest for Comets) and life form remnants, but disclaims the
existence of indigenous life forms. (See, e.g. Ref. 51.) Finally, Mars has
been singled out by the scientific community and NASA's advisory groups as a
planet of active biological interest, both in terms of possible indigenous life
	
i
and life-related molecules. Thus Mars is placed in priority C.
The proposed prioritization of target planets according to biological
interest and contamination concern is based on best available scientific
	
1
judgement. However, there are several possible circumstances which would
require a review and reconsideration of the priority of a planet (in addition
to any regular review process). Such occurrences relative to a target planet
include but are not limited to: increased possibility of the existence of life
forms; the approval for flight of a biological experiment of the life detection
type; the approval for flight of a biological experiment of the organic
constituent, precursor or remnant type; and the subsequent discovery of life
forms, precursors, or remnants.
The preceding development may be summarized as shown in Table 4. Also
indicated is a general statement of the degree of concern and an indication of
the general range of requirements for each category. These considerations will
be discussed below.
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The general rationale, which derives from the proposed policy, is to
impose an increasingly stringent set of requirements on spacecraft
mission/planet combinations which represent an increasing threat to further
scientific investigations of possible life forms, precursors or remnants. This
factor is reflected in Categories I through IV. The principal concern for
Earth return missions, Category V, is the protection of the terrestrial system.
This concern also follows directly from the proposed policy.
Therefore, since Category I consists of missions to planets of no
biological interest, there are no requirements at all. It will be necessary,
however, that a flight project submit a letter to the Chief, Planetary
Protection Program (CPPP) requesting a Category I classification based on the
mission's intended and unintended targets. In the case of Category II missions
the priority of the planets and the type of missions imply only a minimal
degree of concern. The interest is only in terms of life-related molecules
(i.e. organics). Hence accidental impacts should be avoided, and some effort
expended to limit contamination for a direct contact mission. However, the
requirements are for simple documentation only. Flight projects will have to
prepare a short PP Plan primarily to outline intended or potential impact
targets, brief pre-and post-launch analyses detailing impact strategies, and a
post encounter or end-of-mission report whicn will provide the location of
impact if it occurs.
	 The main protection of future science will in fact be
the record of Category II missions, especially the final actual disposition of
the hardware as reported in the End of Mission Report.
Significant biological interest or serious contamination concern
evidenced by the target planet priority and a non-direct contact flight plan
characterize Category 1I1. The concern in this case is manifested in a
specified upper limit on the probability of impact and a requirement for some
contamination control. In practice some trade-off between probability of
impact and classes of contamination control procedures would be established in
the Planetary Protection Plan for a specific Category III spacecraft program.
-32-
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Compliance on the part of projects will depend on the type and specifics
of the missions. For a fly-by, compliance may be limited to a detailed
analysis showing that the probability of impact is below the stated limit
(which may require trajectory biasing). It is not expected that fly-by
missions will have bioload requirements. For orbiter type misions, the
"avoidance of impact" requirement may be levied in the form of an orbital
lifetime. In this instance, compliance by a project will include analysis of
the expected orbits to show that they can be maintained for the period of the
assigned lifetime. Bioload requirements may be levied on orbiters both to
prevent excessive ejecta efflux and to limit the contamination potential in
the event of an unexpected orbit decay. If such requirements are imposed,
they will call for the use of clean room technology but they will not require
a bioassay. Project compliance will necessitate an accurate description and
assessment of the clean room facilities used and the procedures employed.
The types of requirements imposed on Category III missions will consist
of more involved documentation (than Category II) and some implementing
procedures, such as trajectory biasing, clean rooms and occasionally bioburden
reduction. The nature of the contamination control will typically be passive.
That is, the cleanliness of the spacecraft will be inferred from a knowledge
of the efficacy of the standard procedures and methods employed and from prior
facility verification (i.e. indirect measurements). The procedures and
facilities and the analytical method for the inference of cleanliness will be
detailed in the Planetary Protection Plan for the mission. Bioburden
reduction techniques will be used only in the observed occurrence of anomalous
(unplanned) contaminating events such as a clean roots filter failure or a
gross violation of personal procedures (i.e., in an emergency). Even in that
case, the final burden will be estimated rather than directly measured (i.e.,
no bioassay will be performed). Although no impact is intended for Category
III missions, an organics inventory will be required in the End of Mission
Report only if an impact occurs. This inventory will include a list of bulk
organic constituents of the spacecraft hardware and their mass. It will not
include materials in small quantities or the minute amounts of surface
contaminants on the hardware. There will be no requirement to maintain
samples of any organic materials.
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Category IV missions, as defined, pose the greatest threat to further
scientific investigation of extraterrestrial life forms, precursors and
remnants. While Category III missions are to the planets of greatest
biological interest, the Category IV flight plan additionally calls for direct
contact. Thus planetary protection concerns cannot be net by the avoidance of
impact. Generally Category IV missions must control the bioburden on all
hardware which is intended to directly contact the target planet and must meet
limits on the probability of non-nominal impact. Here non-nominal impact
includes both accidental impact by hardware not planned for direct contact and
a significant deviation from plan by the direct contact intended hardware. The
type of requirements imposed include rather detailed documentation (more
involved than Category III), an increased number of implementing procedures, a
bioassay to enumerate the bioburden and a probability of contamination
analysis. The implementing procedures required would include trajectory
biasing, clean rooms, bioload reduction, possibly partial sterilization of the
direct contact hardware and a bioshield for that hardware. Generally the
requirements and compliance will be similar to Viking, with the likely
exception of complete lander/probe sterilization.
To comply with the requirement of no accidental impact the project will
have to present analyses showing that for the selected trajectory(ies) the
corresponding probability(ies) of impact are within what the requirement will
term "acceptable" levels. This may require trajectory biasing. To comply
with the requirements referring to control of bioload, the project will have
to utilize clean rooms and attendant procedures and demonstrate their
effectiveness through a series of independently taken bioassays. An upper
limit on bioload will be imposed which the project cannot exceed. If partial
sterilization (dry heat) is required, the project will have to provide the
facility and means to accomplish it. The facility will be subject to
certification and the means of sterilization (time-temperature-humidity
	
i
	
regimes) subject to approval and monitoring. Following bioload reduction and
partial sterilization (if the latter is required), the project will have to
demonstrate that the spacecraft (lander or probe) is adequately protected
against recontamination, particularly in the STS facilities. This may require
the use of a bioshield or shroud. Whatever the means of protection, the
	
Y	
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project should provide for their continuous monitoring through launch. The 	
i
accounting for bulk constituent organics will involve the inventory referred 	 i
to under Category II1, but it will be required as part of the Pre-Launch
Report.
The concern for Category V missions is the protection of the terrestrial
system, the Earth and the Moon. (The Moon must be protected from back
contamination to retain freedom from PP requirements on Earth-Moon travel.)
However, for the special subcategory, "safe for Earth return", there is no
need for any protection, by definition. Missions in this subcategory will
have PP requirements on the outbound phase only, corresponding to the category
of that phase (typically Category I or II). Such flight projects will have to
formally request this categorization from the CPPP. For all other Category V
missions, the highest degree of concern is expressed by the absolute
prohibition of impact, the need for sterilization of returned hardware which
directly contacted the target planet, and the need for containment of any
unsterilized sample taken there and returned to Earth. In general this
concern is reflected in a range of requirements that encompass those of
Category 1V plus a continuing monitoring of project activities and pre-project
studies and research (e.g., in remote sterilization procedures and containment
techniques). The requirements for the protection of Earth have been and
continue to be the subject of a number of studies which will eventually lead
to their detailed definition. Those requirements will affect all phases of
the mission, namely the outbound leg, the sample acquisition, transfer, and
storage, the sealing of the sample container, the monitoring of the sample,
the return phase of the mission, the Earth entry phase and the sample
receiving laboratory. However, an Earth return mission must be viewed as a
multitarget mission. The target planet must also be protected, insofar as
this does not increase the risk to Earth. As such, the relevant parts of the
documentation and the implementing procedures for the outbound phase'of the
mission must meet or erceed the requirements of the category appropriate if
there were no return phase.
i
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B.	 IMPLEMENTATION AND METHODS OF COMPLIANCE
The two major changes introduced by the new planetary protection (PP)
policy are the shift from a quantitative top level statement and the imposi-
tion of requirements by exception rather than rule. These changes will impact
considerably on the implementation as it will be defined in subsequent
documents, the most important being a revised version of the NhB 8020.12A (24)
type issuance. There will be no attempt at this time to detail the implemen-
tation of the new PP policy. This will be accomplished later in the course of
revising existing implementing issuances. The purpose here is to outline main
changes in the implementing procedures and methods of compliance, make
preliminary assessments of the generic impact of those changes on future
flight projects and highlight other changes which may be warranted in
subordinate implementing issuances. The implementation of the existing policy
as defined in NHB 8020.12A (24) establishes PP requirements by mission class
without any regard to the target planet (except for the Sun and Mercury which
are defined as being of no biological interest). This approach results in
both generic and baseline requirements for any given class of missions
reflecting, of course, the intent of the existing policy. Now much more
stringent than the baseline the generic requirements are depends an the
probability of growth for the target planet.
The implementation of the new policy will adopt a more direct, yet less
generic means of levying requirements. It will be more direct because instead
of establishing requirements by mission class it will do so by target
planet/mission class combinations. This will remove the element of
uncertainty about the extent and severity of PP requirements for any one
mission. It will be less generic because it will utilize more specific and
more numerous categories, via the scheme of target planet/mission class
combinat i ons, than existing implementation. There will be no baseline
requirements across categories in terms of either documentation or hardware
requirements. Additionally, because the new policy no longer is quantitative,
there will be categories of planet/missions with no quantitative requirements.
This will eliminate for those categories the need for analyses and related
documentation. Quantitative requirements under the new implementation will be
levied exceptionally on those planet/mission combinations which warrant them.
-37-
It is anticipated that those quantitative requirements will be different
from the ones imposed by the existing implementation. The latter have evolved
from the quantitative policy they implemented and were designed to serve
probabilistic models which were the keystone of PP analyses. It is not
certain at this time how much the new implementation will deviate from the
probabilistic approach. It is, however, safe to assume that different (and
mostly operational) implementing procedures will be adopted. The emphasis
will be on specific requirements developed for specific planet mission
combinations; these requirements, particularly the quantitative in nature,
will be so designed as to minimise the need for the type of analysis which
employs parameters whose values can only reflect our uncertainty about them.
This change in emphasis will undoubtedly affect existing sk,bordi:oate
implementing issuances, most particularly the Parameter Specification
Book (49). It is anticipated that some of the existing parameters will be
deleted or replaced by a series of quantitative requirements most of which
will be expressed in terms of "hard" values rather than uncert^sfn probability
numbers. This will require extensive study and careful analysis and will be a
major part of the Phase II effort. (Set to begin on October 1, 1981 and to be
completed a year later, this activity will accomplish the revision 6- ali
implementing issuances.)
It was stated above that the quantitative requirements will be imposed
exceptionally on planet/mission combinations which warrant them.
Specifically, given the state of knowledge to date and the latest SSB
recommendations, it is anticipated that only the combinations involving Mars
and Earth will be the exceptions. For Mars and the Earth the combinations
will involve all types of missions (with reducea emphasis for a Mars flyby).
It follows then, that for all other planets there will be no quantitative
requirements. In fact, it is anticipated that for most of the combinations
involving planets other than Mars and Earth there will be no PP requirements
at all. This will result in less cumbersome, more direct and more explicit
implementing issuances.
From the standpoint of future flight projects, the new policy and its
implementation will offer great benefits. Most flight projects will be in
Categories I and II (to planets other than Mars and Earth return) where the
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effect will be almost total relief from any and all requirements. Even in
cases where some documentation requirements may be necessary (Category II),
they will be far less than what the existing implementation requires. For
missions to Mars and Earth return (Categories III, IV and V), the requirements
will be less elaborate, more specific and more in line with the current state
of knowledge. Extensive documentation requirements will be alleviated and
overall compiiance by projects will be both simpler and more easily monitored
and verified.
For NASA's advisory bodes, particularly SSB, the new policy and
implementation will prove responsive to their recommendations to date and will
provide them with a mechanism for a more meaningful, specific input to NASA.
Specifically, when SSB is asked to express a degree of concern about a
planetary body, it will be expressed in terms of real and specific constraints
on missions rather than in terms of an uncertain probability of growth value.
This will allow NASA's advisory bodies to become an integral part of the
establishment and review of PP requirements. Examples of this participation
will include the review of the proposed prioritization of the target planets
and the establishment of the formal assignments and the determination of the
target planets that are safe for Earth return.
In summary, the aim of the new implementing procedures will be to
drastically reduce generic requirements, to remove uncertainties from the
quantitative requirements, and to facilitate compliance and verification. As
in the case with the existing implementation procedures, a revised version of
NHB 8020.12A (24) will be the governing document. It will include the same
chapters as the existing Jocument, namely Introduction, Requirements, MASA
Constraints, Management, and Glossary. In addition to the differences from
the existing version which were described in this report, the revised handbook
will further deviate from its predecessor document in that it will include top
level requirements for missions returning to Earth.
Most of the quantitative requirements will tie included in subordinate
documentation referenced in the handbook. These requirements will be subject
to periodic review to assure their compatibility with the ever changing state
of knowledge.
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C.	 ROLES AND RESPOhSI6ILITIES
An important integral part of a policy document is the establishment of
roles and responsibilities for the administration of the policy and the 	
i
development of amplifications and guidelines. The existing policy documents
assign this responsibility to the Associate Administrator for Space Science.
It is he who provides the funding for the administration of the Planetary
Protection (PP) Program in NASA Headquarters delegating the responsibility for
that program to the PP Officer.
The roles and responsibilities assigned to the Associate Administrator
for Space Science, and through him to the PP Officer, by the existing policy
documents include:
(1) Developing NASA basic policy and amplifications thereof for each
target planet and the Moon.
(2) Prescribing regulations, standards, procedures and guidelines
applicable to all NASA organizations, programs and activities to
achieve the policy objectives.
(3) Certifying to the Administrator prior to launch that each space
flight for the exploration of a planet or its satellite meets the
requirements necessary to achieve the policy objectives.
(4) Conducting reviews, inspections, and evaluations of plans,
facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures and practices of NASA
organizational elements and NASA contractors to discharge the
requirements of the Policy Directive.
(5) Taking actions as necessary to achieve conformance with applicable
policies, regulations and procedures.
(6) Funding supporting research and technology required to implement
the PF program.
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(7)	 Representing NASA in PP technical consultations with other nations
and international bodies such as COSPAR in coordination with the
Assistant Administrator for International Affairs.
The new policy documents should assign similar responsibilities to the
Associate Administrator for Space Science and the PP Officer. Further, they
should explicitly state that those roles and responsibilities are delegated
directly by the Associate Administrator to the PP Officer regardless of the
division within NASA where the PP Officer resides. This has been historically
the case in order to afford the PP Program and the PP Officer a degree of
autonomy from any one NASA division, and authority over individual flight
programs. Autonomy from NASA divisions allows the PP Program to be responsive
to the needs of the agency and the agency's policy without being compromised by
the narrower charter of the division under which the program operates.
Authority over flight programs provides the PP Officer with the necessary
leverage required to assure compliance on the part of individual programs and
program managers.
t
Whatever the new policy and its implementation, the roles and responsibi-
lities should be as clear and direct as they are under the existing policy, and
should strive to ensure that NASA's PP Program is indeed a program of the
agency and not of any of its parts.
D.	 INSTALLATION OF PROPOSED POLICY
The purpose of this report is to frame, detail and explain a new
planetary protection (PP) policy for NASA. In the preceding sections the
in-place PP policy was reviewed, a rationale for a new policy was developed,
its features were analyzed and elements of its top level implementation were
discussed. What this section will describe is how the overall report will lead
to a formal new PP policy and what, if any, the implications and impact of this
policy are on existing international treaties and agreements.
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The existing PP policy is set forth in formal NASA policy documents,
namely NPD 8020.7 (19) and NPD 8020.10A (22). These two documents define the
PP policy and assign responsibility for its execution. They are relatively
short documents signed by NASA's Administrator and/or Deputy Administrator.
It follows then that the present report should eventually yield two new policy
documents (NPD's 8020.7A and 8020.108) which will replace NPD 8020.7 and NPD
8020.10A. The transition from the report to the policy documents will involve
a series of reviews - informal and formal - by NASA's PP Program personnel,
NASA's PP Officer, NASA's Director of Life Sciences, NASA's advisory groups
and NASA centers. It is expected that the report on the new policy - which
does include a policy statement - will first be reviewed by the PP Officer and
the PP Program personnel. Following this review, it is anticipated that the
edited report will be forwarded to NASA's Director of Life Sciences and the
Space Science Board for their review and comments. This step may include
brief presentations by the PP Officer and/or designated PP Program personnel.
This series of reviews will result in a consensus position regarding the new
PP policy. The consensus position will then be presented to NASA's Associate
Administrator for Space Science whose comments should be solicited prior to
the actual preparation of drafts of NPD's 8020.7A and 8020.10B. Preparation
of these documents will then be a simple spatter of stating and defining the
agreed upon policy and assigning roles and responsibilities for its execution.
Roles and responsibilities were addressed in a separate section of this
report. When the draft policy documents are completed, the usual NASA review
cycle for such documents will be followed. This includes review of the
documents by NASA centers and the ultimate review and approval of NASA's
Administrator or his designee.
Communication of the new NASA PP policy to the international community is
presently set for the spring of 1982 during COSPAR's meeting in Ottawa, Canada.
It is expected that the new NPD's will be in place by then, either as drafts
undergoing final review or as formal NASA policy documents. In either case the
new policy will be well formulated and its implementation outlined. From the
work so far on the new PP policy and the direction being followed in its
formulation and implementation some early assessments can be made of its impact
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on the International Treaty (20) and COSPAR requirements. Article IX of the
International Space Treaty of 1967 (20), to which the U.S. is a party, states
in part that
"...parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of
outer space including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to
avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse
changes in the environment of the Earth resulting
from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter..."
The new policy will not violate this commitment. Where "harmful
contamination" is possible, the new policy will provide for its prevention.
The change from the old policy has to do with a redefinition of the need for
protection. Whereas before it was generally assumed that most planetary
bodies needed protection from terrestrial contamination, the new policy
provides protection exceptionally to selected target planets which the current
state of knowledge identifies as needing protection. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the new policy will have little impact on the International
Space Treaty (20).
However, both the treaty and basic COSPAR agreement (1966) (52) to
which the U.S. is a party state that
If
	 basic probability of one in one thousand
(1x10- 3 ) that a planet of interest will be
contaminated shall be used as a criterion during
the period of biological exploration..."
This top level quantitative guideline gave rise to the probabilistic
approach ,,dopted by the existing NASA policy and implemention. The new policy
maintains strictly a qualitative posture without any quantitative guidelines
at the policy level. This represents a deviation from the COSPAR requirement
and will require proposing to the international body a resolution amending the
quantitative guideline. Earlier sections of this report addressed the
inherent disadvantages of such a top level guideline.
	 We believe that
COSPAR's intent- namely, the protection of planets of interest - can be served
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better without an artificial quantitative criterion which encourages
demonstration of compliance via what has come to be known as the "numbers
game
Other COSPAR requirements which will be affected by the new policy an(
its implementation include the "Clean Room" resolution and the reporting
requirements. The clean room resolution proposed in 1916 and adopted in 19;
recommends "the use of the best available clean room technology, comparable
that employed for the Viking missions, for all missions to the outer planet!
and their satellites (50). The new policy provides for no such blanket
requirement. Indeed, for the outer planets and their satellites the new policy
and its implementation will not include this requirement at all. A rationale
will be presented to COSPAR for abandoning the clean room requirement.
The COSPAR reporting requirements call for annual submission of
contamination logs for each of the target planets of exploration. Among the
information included in the logs are estimates of the probability of
contaminating the target planet, the spacecraft bioload at launch and relevant
post-launch and post-encounter updates on missions. Depending on the details
of the implementation of the new policy, some of the above data may have to be
replaced by other types of information. Thus, while reporting regularly to
COSPAR will continue, there may be changes in the form and type of
information.
As the detailed implementation of the new PP policy develops the impact
on COSPAR requirements will be better assessed, particularly as it affects
reporting requirements.
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APPENDIX
IMPLICATIONS AND IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED POLICY
The major impact of the proposed planetary protection policy will be in
the implementation and methods of compliance by future planetary missions. In
fact, this effect is an objective of the policy revision. Therefore, an
assessment of this impact and a discussion of the changes for specific
planetary missions under consideration are in order. However, there are two
other items of concern that both interact strongly with planetary protection
policy and requirements. According to present NASA plans, all future planetary
spacecraft will be launched by the Space Transportation System (STS). It is
important to evaluate the proposed policy in light of this new launch system
and operation and to compare it with the present policy in terms of its utility
in meeting planetary protection needs in the Shuttle era. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the issue of the relationship between the Planetary
Protection Program and the scientific instruments flown on planetary spacecraft
should be examined.
A.	 IMPLICATIONS AND IMPACT ON FUTURE PLANETARY EXPLORATION PROJECTS
As discussed in the main body of this report, the principal effect of the
proposed policy is a significant reduction in the number and stringency of
implementation procedures and activities required of planetary exploration
missions. Although some of the details must await definition in the new
implementing issues to be instituted after the acceptance and approval of the
proposed policy, the general nature of the methods of compliance and
requirements may be examined. The specific spaceflight missions reviewed in
this subsection are: Galileo, a comet fly-by or encounter, International Solar
Polar Mission (ISPM), Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar (VOIR), Saturn Orbiter with
Two Probes (SOP2), and a Mars Surface Sample Return Mission (MSSR). This list
of missions is not exhaustive of all possible planetary exploration missions,
but all are either planned or fairly representative.
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1. Galileo Project is a planetary exploration mission to Jupiter and
its satellites consisting of a probe to Jupiter and an orbiter of the planet.
According to the current mission plan, no other planets are involved. (A Mars
gravitational assist had been planned in a previous version). It will also be 	
i
one of the first planetary missions launched by the Space Transportation
System. Under the existing policy, the Galileo Project is a Class 3 mission 	
i
(Ref.Al) in that a probe to Jupiter is included. However, the Galileo Orbiter
Project and the Galileo Probe Project intend to separately comply with PP
requirements. Thus the Orbiter Project may be Class 2 or 3 in that NHB
8020.12A(Ref.Al) is not specific on planetary projects. The Probe Project is
of course a planetary probe and, therefore, Class 3.
The general requirements for a Class 3 mission are "appropriate
mathematical analyses and microbiological assay and control insuring that the
mission probability of planetary contamination will not exceed its allocation.
For some missions selected hardware may be subject to microbial reduction
requirements" (Ref.Al). Also from NHB 8020.12A, for Class 2 missions only the
analyses are required in all cases; microbiological assay and control M be
needed.
Some specific PP requirements and specifications for the Jupiter Orbiter-
Probe mission (as Galileo was formerly known) were set forth by the PP Program
Office (Ref.A2). The mission probability of contamination allocation was fixed
for Jupiter at 1 x 10- 4 and for each of its satellites at 6.4 x 10-5.
The SSB recommendation for the probability of growth. P(g), for Jupiter and its
satellites, 1 x 10- 14 (Ref.A3), was adopted. A requirement "to utilize
clean room technology similar to Viking (i.e., Class 100,000 clean rooms with
appropriate procedures and controls)" was also imposed. This regi. ::ment was
adopted from a 1916 COSPAR resolution (Ref.A4) and an SSB recommendation
(Ref.A3). The issue of a formal orbital lifetime requirement for Jupiter and
its satellites was resolved and eliminated somewhat later. 	 However, the
Galileo Project was required to avoid impact with Jupiter (by the Orbiter) and
permitted to select a satellite for intentional impact to terminate the
Orbiter's phase of the mission.
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Given the small P;g) for Jupiter and its satellites, the standard
probability of contamination analysis insures Galileo Project compliance with
its allocations without any microbiological assay and with only Voyager-type
contamination controls (Ref.A5) (i.e. including clean rooms operated at Class
100,000 and relaxed procede,es and controls compared to Viking). This
conclusion obtains even for a factor of fifty enhancement in microbial load
over Voyager values, the assumed worst result of Shuttle launch facilities an
standard operation (i.e. only controlled areas) (Ref.A6). a
 Accom ingly the
Project intends to use this standard analysis with a conservatively estimated
microbial burden. No microbiological assay is planned.
The contamination control issue remains unresolved. The Galileo Project
proposed a contamination control plan in outline form similar to that of the
Voyager Project (Ref.A7) (Voyager's PP plan preceded the 1976 COSPAR
resolution). This approach was generally accepted by the PP Program Office
with a recommendation that the Project "analyze the STS situation and, to the
extent possible, quantify the contamination that the STS environment would
introduce to the spacecraft," as a prior condition to a discussion of the
detailed contamination control requirements. (Ref. A8). Subsequently, some
activity to obtain the needed data was initiated according to the KSC Facility
Contamination Verification Test Plan (Ref.A9). a However, the wor<. according
to the plan was not completed.
From the preceeding review of the current state of planetary protection
for the Galileo Project, it is apparent that the present policy permits
considerable vagueness in the requirements, especially in those related to
contamination control. Under the proposed policy, the issues of contamination
control, category (class) of the mission, orbital lifetime, and final
disposition of the Orbiter would not have arisen. The need for most of the
dialog would be obviated by the clarification of the requirements. The
specific requirements would also be significantly relaxed compared to the
present situation.
a See next subsection of this Appendix, "Planetary Protection for Space
Transportation System Launches".
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Under the proposed policy, Galileo Project would be a Category II
mission. No contamination control procedures would be required for planetary
protection. Nowever, the Project would be encouPaged to provide some
contamination control in its own interest. There would be a requirement to
document for the record the planned contamination control and to reference the
expected contamination impact (microbial load) of STS operations. The latter
information would be available through the PP Program based on prior
investigation. Similarly, there would be no requirement for microbiological
assay or microbial burden reduction for either the Orbiter or the Probe. This
definite statement would resolve some of the present issues which need to be
decided on a case by case basis.
The orbital lifetime and final disposition of the Orbiter issues would be
moot under the proposed policy. The requirement would be to declare the
Orbiter phase of the mission to be direct contact and to state the intended
final target. Analogously, the Probe phase would be declared a direct contact
with Jupiter.
Finally, there would be no required mathematical analysis of the
probability of contamination. Accordingly, the specification by the PP Program
of allocations and probabilities of growth would not be needed.
The principal PP requirements would be simplified forms of the documen'.'s
called for under the present policy. The Planetary Protection Plan would
describe the mission with regard to PP interests (i.e. planets involved, forms
of encounter, etc.) and reference the mission planning document. The category
of the mission would be declared to be Category II. The planned contamination
control measures would be documented, and reference made to the expected
microbial burden.
The Pre-Launch Report would document any changes from the original plan
of PP significance (for approval) and review the implementation of the
contamination control measures. Values of the probability of impact for those
planets not intended to be impacted would also be provided. Specifically, the
launch vehicle (Centaur) for the entire Jupiter system, the Probe for the
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satellites of Jupiter, and the Orbiter for Jupiter and all satellites, besides
that one specified for final disposition in the PP Plan, would be evaluated.
The Post-Launch report would document any launch anomalies of PP
significance and update the probabilities of impact cited in the Pre-Launch
Report (as necessary). The End of Mission Report would document any anomalies
of PP significance during the mission after launch. It would also be a record
of the actual final disposition of all spacecraft hardw-ua re that impacted any
planet, including location. Presumably, the Probe entered the atmosphere of
Jupiter at specified latitude and longitude. and the Orbiter impacted the
satellite specified in the Plan at specified coordinates and velocity.
2.	 Comet Encounter Missions are of significant interest to current
NASA mission planning due in part to the 1985 apparition of Comet Halley. Such
missions span the range from rendezvous (a close encounter with velocity
matching), .<uch as the C^.iet Tempel 2 phase of the once contemplated
International Comet Mission (ICM), to a simple ballistic fly-by, as in the
Halley Intercept Mission (HIM). There are also probes, such as the Comet
Halley phase of ICM. Finally a sample return mission from Comet Halley may
also be considered.
One of the first issues under the present planetary protection policy and
implementation is the determination of the appropriate class for a probe or a
rendezvous mission. A comet fly-by is, however, given as an example of class 2
and a sample return mission is unambiguously class 4 (Ref.AI). A casual
reading of the same document would seem to indicate that a comet probe mission
is class 3. However, as a practical mattUr, even if the comet has a physical
nucleus, the probability of impact of an attempted probe with on-board
navigation capability will only be 10- 3 (Ref.A9). This value, and even
smaller values for ballistic probes, would suggest that class 2 (i.e. fly-by)
treatment is appropriate. Rendezvous missions might be labeled class 2 as
orbiters with capability to leave the comet at end-of-mission. If a physical
nucleus were found (riot known at present, Ref.A9) and a "landing" were
attempted, the issue of changing the class retrospectively to 3 would arise.
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In any case, the present requirements include a Planetary Quarantine
Plan, a Probability of Contamination Analysis Plan, a Pre-Launch Analysis of
Proba'ility of Planetary Contamination, a Post-Launch Analysis of Compliance
with COSPAR Recommendations, and an end-of-project supplement. If the mission
is class 3, then microbiological assays are required. The P c analysis would
	 1
need a specification of the probability of growth parameter P(g), which is not
presently available. (See Ref.A9 for a recommendation of nil.) If the adopted
t
value of P(g) is sufficiently large, a class 3 mission would require microbial
burden reduction procedures and assays would be mandatory for class 2. A comet
sample return mission would have to comply with the class 3 requirements for
its outbound phase and certain requirements yet to be determined in order to
	 j
insure that the probability of Earth contamination will be an acceptable risk"
(Ref.Al).
Under the proposed policy, any conetary mission would be Category II,
except a sample return mission, which would be Category V. Thus, the issue of
the classification would be resolved. The general requirements for the
outbound phase of a sample return mission and the entirety of all other
missions would be for documentation only, as described in the main body of the
report and in the previous subsection on Galileo. Specific features of a covet
mission PP Plan include a description of the intent of the mission (i.e.
fly-by, probe, rendezvous and landing). The uncertainty in the success of an
intended impact or landing would be simply resolved by a declaration of the
final actual disposition in the End of Mission Report. There would be no
probability of contamination analysis, no nerd for a specification of P(g), no
microbiological assay, and no microbial burden reduction.
The requirements for the sample acquisition and Earth return phases of a
sample return mission depend on whether comets are declared "safe for Earth
return". As discussed in the main body of the text, this matter would have to
be established by the SSB and the various consultative committes and approved
by COSPAR. If comets are safe for Earth return, there would be no requirements
beyond those outlined above. If not, the requirements would include those
described below for the later phases of a Mars Surface Sample Return mission.
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3. The International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM) was planned as a high
heliocentric latitude solar observation project consisting of a NASA and a
European Space Agency (ESA) spacecraft. The spacecraft would attain the high
latitude and swing back over the sun by a gravitational assist at Jupiter.
Although the mission is not planetary exploration, the encounter with Jupiter
requires compliance with Planetary Protection.
Under the present policy, ISPM is a class 2 mission (Ref.Al). The
documentation requirements are as indicated previously for class 2 (or see
Ref.Al). The required mathematical analysis for the probability of
contamination must consider Jupiter and all of its satellites. The hardware
with impact potential includes the two spacecraft, the launch vehicle (out of
'	 Earth orbit) and a structural adapter.
The issues to be resolved are the need for microbiological assay and for
clean rooms. As in the case of the Galileo Project, these ma t ters are
intimately related to the planned STS launch. The ISPM Project intends to 	 {
demonstrate that prudent upper limit estimates of the microbial burden, coupled
with the small P(g) values for the Jupiter system and necessarily small	 i
probabilities of impact (a Project requirement) will obviate any need for an
assay. The Project also intends to claim that the 1916 COSPAR resolution
(Ref.A4) and SSB recommendation (Ref.A3) concerning the use of clean rooms do
not apply to ISPM. The grounds for this position are that ISPM is not an
exploratory mission to the outer planets.
Under the proposed policy ISPM would be a category II mission. There
would be no requirement for any analysis, for any assay or for contamination
control. The required documentation would be as noted in the main body of the
report and similar to Galileo in .'itai 1.
4. The Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar (VOIR) mission consists of an
orbiting spacecraft at Venus ► pith rather specialized instrumentation to neap the
surface of the planet. Under the present policy, there is some uncertainty as
to the classification of orbiters. Further, the planet itself has been
declared impossible to contaminate (P(g)=0), and only the atmosphere remains a
planetary protection concern.	
-55-
Given that the orbit will eventually decay and the spacecraft will enter
the atmosphere, VOIR is a class 3 mission under the present policy.
►^
	
	 Alternatively, the Project could plan a terminal orbit adequate to ensure a low
probability of impact with the atmosphere during the period of biological
exploration of Venus and obtain a class 2 approval.
In either case a probability of contamination analysis would be required
and probably a microbiological assay. With a high probability of eventual
impact (greater than 3x10- 3 ), a typical burden estimate (2x10 7 ), and the
current specification of P(g) for the atmosphere (10- 9 ), a preliminary
analysis would exceed a typical allocation (6x10- 5 ). Therefore, the assay,
contamination control and even possible microbial reduction procedures would be
mandated. The situation with an STS launch may be even more severe because of
the higher expected microbial burden (Ref.A6). The detailed analysis would
also be complicated by the difficulty of treating the contamination of an
atmosphere (as opposed to a planetary surface).
The documentation requirements for this mission are the Planetary
Protection Plan, Probability of Contamination Analysis Plan, Microbiological
Assay Plan, Microbial Reduction Plan (possibly), Pre-Launch Analysis of
Probability of Planetary Contamination, Post-Launch Analysis of Compliance with
COSPAR Recommendations, and the "end-of-project" supplement.
Under the proposed policy, VOIR would be a Category II mission. There
would be no requirement for analysis, assay, contamination control, or
microbial burden reduction. The documentation required would be as described
in the main body of the text, and in detail would be similar to that of
Galileo.
5.	 Saturn Orbiter with Twin Probes (SOP2) is one proposed mission to
`allow up the Voyager Project. It is conceptually similar to Galileo except,
course, to the Saturn System. However, the second probe is intended for
tan, and has important planetary protection consequences. With this exception
e requirements and issues for this mission are identical to those of Galileo.
cordingly, this discussion will be limited to the probe of Titan.
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Under the present policy SOP2 is a class 3 mission. With the
conservative estimate for the microbial burden associated with the probe of
108 (Ref.A6) and an STS launch and a P(g) for Titan of 10- 10 , a typical
allocation would be exceeded. Consequently, a microbiological assay and
microbial burden reduction are both required, in addition to the probability
of contamination analysis and contaminatiog control. The documentation
requirements are the complete set per Reference Al (or see the preceeding
discussion of VOIR).
Under the proposed policy the SOP2 mission would be Category II. The
requirements would be for documentation only. The detailed documents would be
similar to those of Galileo.
6.	 Mars Surface Sample Return (MSSR) is a generic mission where a
spacecraft is landed on Mars and part or all of the landed hardware is returned
to Earth with a sample of the surface. MSSR must, therefore, comply with
planetary protection provisions which pertain to the protection of future
science at Mars and which pertain to the protection of the Earth against back
contamination.
Although the present policy embraces both of these concerns, the
supplementing issuances do not really address the protection of the Earth.
Specifically, the basic requirements document (Ref.Al) provides that for any
sample return mission, "appropriate analyses must be performed and controls
exercised, to insure that the probability of earth (sic) contamination will be
an acceptable risk." However, it continues, "The requirements applicable to
the earthbound portions of such missions are yet to be determined." Some
studies have been performed under the PP Program which address these matters
(Refs. A10 and All). The outbound mission requirements for MSSR, a class 4
mission under the present policy, are the same as class 3 (Ref.Al).
Under the new policy, a MSSR mission would be a Category V mission.
General requirements for such a mission are outlined in the main body of this
report. To further detail these requirements and to assess their implications
and impact on an MSSR mission, the latter will be divided into three phases:
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a) outbound, (b) sample acquisition and delivery, and (c) science and
quarantine investigations.
a. Outbound. Requirements for this phase provide for protecting
Mars from Earth contamination. These requirements are detailed in the main
body of this report under Category iV missions, and to a large extent, are
similar to those imposed on and implemented by the Viking pro-ect. One notable
exception is the sterilization of the complete lander/probe which, under the
new implementing procedures, would be replaced by a requirement for steriliza-
tion of selected parts. This would impact favorably on the project both in
terms of methods of compliance and in the design and construction of the
spacecraft.
b. Sample Acquisition and Delivery. This phase of the mission
begins with the acquisition of the sample on Mars and ends with the delivery of
the sample to the Mars Receiving Laboratory (MRL) on Earth or Earth orbit.
Included in this phase are all near Mars activities, the Mars to Earth transit,
Earth entry, recovery, and transport to the MRL. Requirements for this phase
will be aimed at protecting the Earth from Mars and other extraterrestrial
contamination. A general outline of these requirements is presented in the
main body of this report under Category V missions. Specific requirements
would be developed in the near future and would be included in an official NASA
implementing document similar to NHB 8020.12A (Ref.Al). It is anticipated that
the major thrust of the requirements will address the sealing of the sample;
verification, maintenance, and monitoring of the seal; and the means to prevent
any accidental release of extraterrestrial material at the Earth. Specific
reg0 rements will also address issues and activities concerned with sample
acquisition, transfer and storage, and active safety features to be used in
non-nominal conditions. Furthermore, there will be guidelines for pre-project
studies and research to validate PP approaches toward meeting requirements;
multiple certifications will be required, at key mission milestones, to assure
that requirements have been met.
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C.	 Science and Quarantine Investigation. This phase of an MSSR
mission begins with the receipt of the sealed Mars sample in the MRL.
Requirements for this phase will be aimed at assuring Earth safety when the
sample is released from its container and throuChout the study of the sample.
There will be explicit requirements for the construction, management, and
containment capabilities of the MRL; an extensive PP protocol for studying the
sample; guidelines for handling the sample during scientific investigations;
and strict conditions and requirements concerning the ultimate release of the
sample for scientific investigation outside the MRL.
In summary, the outbound phase of an MSSR mission will be favorably
impacted by the new PP policy. Requirements will be somewhat relaxed from
those imposed on Viking under the old policy and implementation. The other two
phases of the mission will be seriously impacted by the new policy not in
relative terms, since there never was a formal policy addressing those phases,
but in terms of the anticipated range of requirements deemed essential for
affording Earth the same protection, at the very least, as is provided for
planets of interest. The extent of this impact on an MSSR project will depend
on the severity of specific requirements to be developed in the near future.
B.	 PLANETARY PROTECTION FOR SPACE TRANSPOkTATION SYSTEM LAUNCHES
The principal differences of interest to Planetary Protection for a space
Transportation System (STS) launch instead of a conventional launch are the
elimination of an aerodynamic payload shroud and a more contaminating
environment than typically experienced by planetary spacecraft. The
aerodynamic shroud is not required because the spacecraft will be enclosed in
the Orbiter cargo bay during launch and ascent to orbital altitude. The
additional contamination will occur because the spacecraft will be exposed to
the environments of more facilities and in particular to more contaminating
environments. The impact of the proposed PP policy will be to reduce the
magnitude of the problem posed by the elimination of the shroud and the
increased contamination.
r1
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These two matters are intimately related in ierms of planetary
protection. In the ground operations for a conventional launch, the 	 I{
contamination history of a spacecraft is independent of the launch vehicle.
The spacecraft is encapsulated in the aerodynamic shroud prior to its entry
into the only launch vehicle facility that it sees, the launch pad. This
feature of the ground operations allows contamination control in the spacecraft
assembly and checkout facilities (only) to be a useful PP requirement.
Further, other PP requirements that are imposed on certain planetary
spacecraft, such as microbial assay and microbial burden reduction, are made
meaningful. The microbial burden values determined directly from an assay or
I
inferred from a controlled burden reduction procedure are relevant because no 	 i
further microbiological contamination of the spacecraft can occur. All that is
required is a clean shroud interior. As contamination control mandated by the
	 !
present PP policy provides "free" science instrument protection, the
aerodynamic shroud necessitated by a conventional launch provides a "free" PP
encapsulation system.
A planetary spacecraft launched by STS will be exposed to facilities
during and after mating with its launch vehicle (e.g. an Inertial Upper Stage
or a Centaur). These launch vehicle facilities include the Vertical Processing
Facility (VPF), the payload canister and transporter, the Rotating Service
Structure (RSS) Payload Change-out Room, and the Orbiter cargo bay for vertical
payloads (typical of planetary spacecraft). Horizontally loaded spacecraft
will be exposed to the Operations and Checkout (0 & C) Building and the Orbiter
Processing Facility (OPF) instead of the VPF and the RSS.
One approach to compliance with the requirements of the present PP policy
would be to apply contamination control to these facilities as well as
spacecraft (only) assembly and checkout facilities. However, these facilities
have not been designed nor will they be operated as cleanrooms (class 100,000
or better). There are no requirements in the design specifications or the
operational procedures for microbiological evaluation and control. The weak
specifications for organic and particulate contamination in the intramural
volume apply to the conditioned air at the inlet only. Where surface
contamination specifications are stated, there is a "visibly clean" requirement
only. Basically these facilities are poorly designed for contamination control
because there were no such design requirements.
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From the design and intended operations, most of the STS ground
facilities will be characterized as "controlled areas" (about class
300,000b). Preliminary data obtained by J.R. Puleo (Ref. A13) as part of the
KSC Facility Contamination Verification Test Plan (Ref.A9) shows that the OPF
consistently was more contaminating than class 100,000 c both by volumetric
sampling and fallout sampling. The 0 & C Building had contamination levels at
the upper limits of class 10,000c . However, activity in the building
"during the monitoring period" was minimal. The reported data is of viable
particulates as required for evaluation of microbial contamination. It should
be noted that this effort has been terminated prior to completion. There are
no plans to determine the microbiological contamination in the VPF and the RSS,
the facilities through which vertically processed spacecraft must pass, or in
the Orbiter bay. (All planned planetary spacecraft will be vertically
processed.)
Contamination control, difficult in the ground facilities, may be
impossible during launch and deployment. In addition to exposure to the bay
interior and the launch vehicle, a planetary spacecraft may be sharing the
Orbiter cargo bay with another payload with absolutely no microbiological
controls. The launch environment will it this case redistribute the microbial
load onto the planetary space-raft. Finally the spacecraft must suffer the
contaminating environment external to the Orbiter. For PP considerations, the
debris cloud through which the spacecraft must pass is the main concern, since
the debris will include viable particles. However the exhaust of the Orbiter's
maneuvering and attitude control systems constitutes a source of organics that
should be noted.
For missions where the presenti policy requires either a microbiological
assay or a microbial burden reduction, the features of the STS ground and
launch operations pose a problem. As has been noted, an assay must be
performed after the last contaminating operation. There are two possible
approaches. The microbiological assay could be performed in the RSS. The
b Federal Standard 209B, Ref. Al2
C NASA Standard NHB 5340.2, Ref. A14
A
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Orbiter bay and the launch vehicle would have to be microbially cleaned in
separate prior operations. The planetary spacecraft and its launch vehicle
would have to be microbially cleaned in separate prior operations. The
planetary spacecraft and its launch vehicle would have to be the only payload
in the bay for the STS launch. Finally an estimated increment in microbial
load due to deployment would be applied. The problems with this approach
include the STS timeline (schedule doesn't allow time for bay cleaning or
spacecraft assay), various jurisdictional disputes (over launch vehicle and bay
cleaning), safety issues, and the additional cost of a sole launch. The data
for a valid estimate of the deployment contamination is also needed. The
alternative approach is to perform the assay in the spacecraft assembly and
checkout facility and then encapsulate the spacecraft in a contamination shroud
before it is moved to the facility (VPF or 0 b C) for integration with the
launch vehicle. The disadvantages of this approach are the cost of the shroud,
the lack of further access to the spacecraft (or alternatively the risk of a
forced PP violation or launch abort), and the mission risk of a shroud
deployment failure.
For missions where the present PP policy requires a microbial burden
reduction, a contamination shroud is the only reasonable method. The reduction
procedure and the encaspsulation would both be accomplished off (the STS) line.
The spacecraft would then enter the STS operations at launch vehicle
integration (VPF or 0 6 C).
With this review of the pertinent features of an STS launch of a
planetary spacecraft, the impact of the proposed PP policy and implementing
issuances may now be considered. Generally the proposed policy would allow
most STS launches with no special procedures to be compatible with PP
requirements. For Category I missions, which have no PP requirements, there is
no effect of the STS launch facilities and procedures at all, for example.
Under the proposed policy only minor PP requirements at most would be
imposed, as a result of the STS system, on Category II missions. Basically,
the largely unknown but putatively high microbial contamination due to STS
operations does pose a problem for the acceptance of the policy. The
resolution of this problem requires prior measurements of the microbial
E
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contamination levels of the facilities by the PP program one time only. With
this data, the estimated typical spacecraft microbial burden could be accepted
by PP for Category II missions. That is, standard STS procedure and
specifications would be approved for Category II missions. Alternatively
certain minor improvements in procedure could be specified in the implementing
issuances (e.g., replacement of the bay liner, tenting of the spacecraft,
etc.). However, exhaustive and expensive procedural requirements would violate
the intent of the proposed policy. For this reason a requirement for a
contamination shroud is not recommended for Category II missions. For Category
III missions, the requirement for passive bioload control in the face of an STS
launch will be definitely reflected in the PP implementing issuances. In this
case, not only must the expected contamination due to standard STS operations
have been previously determined (as needed for Category II), but also the
efficacy of special contamination control procedures. These contamination
control procedures would be documented as requirements in the implementing
issuances for STS launched Category III missions. Depending on the
determination of the contamination, these special arrangements (special to
standard STS operations) might include bay liner replacement, spacecraft
te,-.ting, enhanced personnel garmenting and access control, facility cleaning
(such as the bay itself), and facility microbial assay. The mission should
also be given the alternative, as an option, of employing a contamination
shroud.
For Category IV and Category V (priority C target planet) missions, the
obvious recommendation is the requirement of a contamination shroud. This is a
severe and costly requirement, but the only logical choice. Some cost sharing
may be possible, however, in that the contamination shroud will also function
as a bioshield in the conventional sense.
F
C.	 SCIENCE INSTRUMENTS AND PLANETARY PROTECTION POLICY
There are two ways that biological and chemical contaminants can affect
scientific results in the planetary exploration program. One mode is the
	 G
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contamination of the environment of a planet (or other body) so that the
opportunity to make future observations of the original state of the planet is
lost. The second route is the contamination of payloads and scientific
instruments causing scientific determinations to be erroneous.
The purpose of the NASA Planetary Protection Program is to preserve the
original state of the planets by preventing their contamination. To accomplish
this, requirements and constraints have been developed that are applicable to
various miss:-,ns. The program does not specifically protect scientific
payloads or instruments. In fact, scientific payloads are subject to the same
requirements and constraints as any spacecraft hardware in terms of allowable
microbial burden and organic chemical contamination.
However, there have been instances where the implementation of bioburden
reduction and cleaning procedures for the spacecraft incidentally provided
contamination protection for scientific payloads. Also, in the past, the
Planetary Protection Program has provided contamination control, cleaning and
sterilization for certain biological instruments on an exceptional basis,
specifically for the Viking mission. In these cases there were system
requirements for the instruments more stringent than those imposed on either
the spacecraft or the instruments by planetary protection. Although this was
not a Planetary Protection Program responsibility, it was convenient to utilize
the unique capabilities developed for the program.
Under the proposed policy, the Planetary Protection Program will have no
responsibility for, and will not provide, contamination control or bioburden
reduction services for science payloads. This responsibility will be assigned
to the appropriate principal investigators and the project offices. Note that
the need for contamination control for science instrument protection may be
enhanced, with the relaxation of Planetary Protection requirements for
s
spacecraft. For missions involving the return of extraterrestrial samples to
Earth, this same assignment of responsibilities will be made for the
preservation of the integrity of the sample during the total mission. In
addition, the Planetary Protection Program will not be responsible for any
damage to scientific instruments or for any morphological, chemical or
biological changes in a returned sample caused by the project's implementation
of planetary protection requirements.
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